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ABSTRACT 
 Corporate directors, shareholders, judges and scholars are on edge. Directors yearn for a 
certain kind of shareholder, especially one that is patient and focused on the company, as opposed 
to indexers, who must hold it as part of their basket, or traders, who own fleetingly.  Shareholders 
want a voice, and that patient-focused cohort has the softest one today, crowded out by indexers, 
like BlackRock, and legions of day traders, like those stalking GameStop. Courts, struggling under 
the conflicting weight of the business judgment rule and fairness scrutiny, look to shareholder 
voice as a solution. Yet scholars are troubled by the extensive weight judges give to shareholder 
voice, particularly to insulate director decisions from review.  
 While a perfect solution to these multiple conundrums is a pipe-dream, there is one that 
will meet the appetite of many directors and shareholders, while easing the judicial burden and 
scholarly angst: on corporate matters where stakes run high, directors should submit proposals 
to a special vote of the patient-focused shareholders, in addition to any other vote required by law 
or contract. Directors achieve an important goal of cultivating this shareholder cohort; those 
shareholders appreciate their voice being temporarily amplified, without disenfranchising other 
shareholders; judges get a reliable datapoint for choosing between deference or scrutiny; and 
scholars are assured an additional source of investor protection. Not perfect, but inexpensive, 
useful, and posing scant downside. This Article explains the concept and puts it into historical, 
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Shareholders lost billions of dollars in one of the bitterest corporate battles of the past decade: Dell 
Inc.’s 2013 going private in a cash-out merger.1 Founder and majority shareholder Michael Dell 
offered a price far below value—less than $14 for a stock later appraised at nearly $18.2   Following 
conventional practice, a special Dell Inc. board committee added a condition that the deal be 
approved by a majority of the non-founder shares (called a “majority of minority” or MoM 
condition).3 
 A fierce fight followed, pitting Dell against such long-term and focused shareholders as 
Southeastern Asset Management and T. Rowe Price (called quality shareholders or QSs),4 as short-
term speculators piled in and passive index funds stood by. After only slightly improved terms, 
Dell narrowly eked out the required shareholder votes—51%—and the shareholders ate a loss of 
$4 per share.5 Those lost billions could have been saved by the device this Article introduces: a 
condition that the deal also be approved by a majority of shares owned by quality shareholders 
(call this a “majority of quality” or MoQ condition). 
 Cases like Dell stoke debate, as corporate proposals approved by independent committees 
and MoMs win directors significant judicial deference.6 Observers discern a trend toward greater 
judicial deference to these private arrangements, due in part to the rise of independent directors 
and, according to many, the increasing sophistication of shareholders.7 In prevailing debate, some 
portray today’s deference as an undesirable retreat from the judiciary’s important disciplining role8 
while others pronounce the triumph of private market forces that happily rings the death knell for 
 
1 See Guhan Subramanian, Deal Process Design in Management Buyouts, 130 HARV. L. REV. 590, 
595-610 (2016). 
2 Id. at 610 (the offer was $13.75; a judicial appraisal proceeding after the transaction found the per 
share value was $17.62). 
3 See Edward B. Rock, MOM’s Approval in a World of Activist Shareholders (NYU working paper 
2017); Zohar Goshen, The Efficiency of Controlling Corporate Self-Dealing: Theory Meets Reality, 91 
CALIF. L. REV. 393, 402 (2003).   
4 See Buck Hartzell, How to Find Companies with Quality Shareholders, THE MOTELY FOOL (Sept. 
10, 2020); Brian Langis, Who Are the Quality Shareholders and Why Have Them?, VALUE WALK (June 8, 
2020); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Catering to the Quality Shareholders You Want, NACD DIRECTORSHIP 
(May/June 2019). 
5 Subramanian, supra note 1, at 608 (51%). 
6 E.g., Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015); Kahn v. M&F 
Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). Doctrinally, while courts would otherwise scrutinize board 
decisions in such settings for “entire fairness,” taking these two steps shifts the standard to business 
judgement rule deference, all but assuring no rebuke.   
7 See infra text accompanying notes 169-201. 
8 E.g., Iman Anabtawi, The Twilight of Enhanced Scrutiny in Delaware M&A Jurisprudence, 43 
DEL. J. CORP. L. (2019); James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, Delaware’s Retreat: Exploring Developing 
Fissures and Tectonic Shifts in Delaware Corporate Law, 42 DEL. J. CORP. L. 323 (2018); Charles R. 
Korsmo, Delaware’s Retreat from Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 55 (2019). 
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corporate law.9 Yet others believe the current ad hoc approach works10 while skeptics offer 
wholesale shifts.11   
 This Article takes a different view. First, while directors have certainly become more 
independent, it remains unclear if that contributes to increased firm value;12 more importantly, 
while shareholders have become more institutional, they are neither monolithic nor omniscient.13 
Varying in their strategies and behavior, their votes on director proposals contain different signals 
that might warrant different judicial interpretations.  
 For instance, in a recognized body of academic research, institutional shareholders are 
segmented by time horizon and portfolio concentration.14 Three dominant groups are indexers, 
who are long-term but never concentrate; transients, who may concentrate but never for long; and 
quality shareholders, who are both long-term and concentrated.15 The quality of their voting may 
vary accordingly, and judges might prudently take such shareholder segmentation into 
consideration when weighing a vote’s influence on judicial review of director decisions. 
 Second, judicial deference to such decisions may be approaching a zenith, but that is where 
Delaware courts have repeatedly invited corporate directors and shareholders to reach.16 A review 
of the case law dating back nearly a century shows repeated deference to both independent 
directors and shareholder votes, long before the contemporary rise of institutional shareholders.  
 In fact, early cases express confidence in the shareholders of the day, largely individuals 
and families, who followed traditional buy-and-hold investment strategies.17 The prevailing 
portrait of such institutions as “sophisticated,” in contrast to individuals, is belied by the recent 
pattern of individual shareholders successfully outfoxing such institutions, at companies such as 
GameSpot.18  
 Third, rather than lament judicial retreat or celebrate a wake for corporate law’s death, 
better to invent tools for directors to use in seeking shareholder approval and for courts to reference 
when deciding what weight to give it. Directors have long conditioned certain transactions on 
 
9 Zohar Goshen & Sharon Hannes, The Death of Corporate Law, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV. 263 (2019). 
10 Matteo Gatti, Did Delaware Really Kill Corporate Law? Shareholder Protection in a Post-
Corwin World, 16 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 345 (2020).   
11 Ann Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, 44 J. CORP. L. 297 (2018). 
12 See Gregory H. Shill, The Independent Board as Shield, 77 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1811 (2020); 
see infra text accompanying notes 46-76. 
13 See infra text accompanying notes 169-201.  
14 Brian Bushee, Identifying and Attracting the “Right” Investors: Evidence on the Behavior of 
Institutional Investors, 16 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 28, 29 (2004). 
15 Id.  For examples of each cohort, see infra text accompanying notes 178-180 (noted indexers are 
BlackRock, State Street, Vanguard; noted transients are AQR, AIM and Tradebot; and noted quality are 
Capital Research, Fidelity, and Wellington).  
16 See infra text accompanying notes 117-Error! Bookmark not defined..   
17 See John C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contestable Are 
U.S. Public Corporations? 24 J. CORP. L. 837, 848 (1999) (noting salience of controlling shareholders in 
earlier periods); infra note 83 and accompanying text. 





approval by such cohorts as a supermajority of the whole or majority of the minority or both.19 
This Article proposes another tool: the MoQ as an additional separate vote of those with the longest 
holding periods and highest concentration. Many directors and companies try to cultivate such 
shareholders through a variety of corporate policies, from communications to dividends, making 
this additional tool particularly appealing to that group.20 
 Boards opting to add this condition would have discretion in defining requisite duration 
and concentration. Their best starting point is to adapt the empirical academic research that 
developed the shareholder segmentation model.21 The model has been applied to shareholder 
voting generally22  and to the particular context of judicial review of board decisions approved by 
shareholders.23  
 In short, this Article responds to the following series of conundrums: Directors yearn for a 
certain kind of shareholder, especially one that is patient and focused on the company, as opposed 
to indexers, who must hold it as part of their basket, or traders, who own fleetingly.  Shareholders 
want a voice, and that patient-focused cohort has the softest one today, crowded out by indexers, 
like BlackRock, and legions of day traders. Courts, struggling under the conflicting weight of the 
business judgment rule and fairness scrutiny, look to shareholder voice as a solution. Yet scholars 
are troubled by the extensive weight judges give to shareholder voice, particularly to insulate 
director decisions from review.  
 While a perfect solution to these multiple conundrums is a pipe-dream, the MoQ responds 
to all of these problems. It will meet the appetite of many directors and shareholders, while easing 
the judicial burden and scholarly angst: on matters where stakes run high, directors would submit 
proposals to a special vote of the patient-focused shareholders. Directors achieve an important goal 
of cultivating this shareholder cohort; those shareholders appreciate their voice being temporarily 
amplified; judges get a reliable datapoint for choosing between deference or scrutiny; and scholars 
are assured an additional source of investor protection.  
 
19 E.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). Separate votes of different classes of 
stock are also sometimes required by law or corporate charter.  E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 242(b)(2) 
(2020) (requiring separate class voting on charter amendments that alter the rights of a class); VantagePoint 
Venture Partners 1996 v. Examen, Inc., 871 A.2d 1108 (Del. 2005) (comparing California and Delaware 
law on class voting on mergers).  MoQs are analogous to dual class capital structures, where two classes 
have different voting rights, often with a high-vote class held by founders. See Zohar Goshen & Assaf 
Hamdani, Corporate Control and Idiosyncratic Vision, 125 YALE L.J. 560 (2016). The concepts may have 
the same rationale that certain shareholders—founders in particular, QSs in general—are uniquely focused 
and patient. On the other hand, dual class is criticized for insulating management from accountability and 
diminishing power of the rest of the shareholder body.  See Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One 
Share, One Vote, and the False Promise of Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445 (2008).  
MoQs have neither drawback. See infra text accompanying notes 227-228. 
20 See Edward B. Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 849 
(2012); Tamara Belinfanti, Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789 (2014); 
infra text accompanying notes 156-168. 
21 Bushee, supra, note 14. 
22 Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 541, 545 n.6 (2016). 
23 James D. Cox, Tomas J. Mondino &  Randall S. Thomas, Understanding the (Ir)relevance of 
Shareholder Votes on M&A Deals, 69 DUKE L.J. 503, 556-560 (2019). 
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 Part I of this Article reviews the demographics of corporate directors and shareholders, as 
they have evolved over the past half century. It traces the gradual rise since 1965 of independent 
directors24  and then shows the steady rise since 1985 of institutional investors.25 Independent 
directors came to dominate corporate boards through a variety of forces, of which state corporation 
law was a modest but enthusiastic one.  
 While the evidence indicates that the director independence movement has contributed 
systemic value—more efficient stock markets, superior disclosure26—it also shows scant value 
added at the firm level, where corporate law and judicial review of board decisions operate. It is 
possible that the inside directors whom the independent directors displaced commanded diverse 
expertise that was of more value to their individual companies.27  
 This hypothesis is both interpretive and cautionary: a realization that director independence 
likely do not add firm value may lead all participants to favor decisions of the other corporate 
decisionmaker, the shareholders; cautionary because, just as independent directors did less for 
firms than many hoped, prudence suggests restraint in presuming that today’s institutional 
shareholders will do any better—particularly because, as we’ll see, many lack the attributes of the 
model shareholders to which the case law has so steadily deferred.   
 Part II examines the courts’ deference, reviewing the cases addressing judicial review of 
director decisions, based on director independence, shareholder votes, or both.  It reveals the 
vintage, frequency and rationales of such deference across various fact patterns and doctrinal 
frameworks.28 It shows how judicial deference has routinely been given, for nearly a century, to 
informed board decisions made largely by independent directors; such deference has been 
particularly strong when the decision was also approved by disinterested fully-informed 
shareholders. 
 Discussion explains that reliance on shareholder voting has long had a particular 
shareholder type in mind—implicitly in the earlier period, the traditional buy-and-hold shareholder 
and, explicitly in more recent years, shareholders who are disinterested, fully-informed and 
uncoerced. In contrast, current scholarship talks of increased judicial deference tied to the rise of 
sophisticated institutional investors.29 Accordingly, this Article suggests there is both less of an 
 
24 See infra text accompanying notes 45-76. 
25 See infra text accompanying notes 77-107.  
26 See Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465 (2007).  
27 Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rediscovering Board Expertise: Legal Implications of the Empirical 
Literature, 77 U. CINN. L. REV. 465 (2008). 
28 Id.  It is customary to delineate corporate fiduciary duty cases into categories such as interested 
directors, takeover defense, one-bid takeovers, multiple-bid takeovers, and controlling shareholder cases. 
E.g., LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, CORPORATIONS: CASES AND MATERIALS 461-481, 537-543, 551-570, 
601-619, 619-644 (10th ed. 2019) But despite doctrinal contours among such fact patterns, Delaware courts 
in all of them have long and steadily encouraged using independent directors and shareholder votes by 
giving greater deference to challenged decisions when such procedures are used. For this reason, while a 
MoQ might be of most obvious use in controlling shareholder situations such as Dell, it may be appealing 
as an additional check on any major corporate decision. 
29 E.g., Cox & Thomas, supra note 8, at 380-381 (contemporary judicial “retreat” the 
“sophistication of public shareholders” and would have little “salience except in a world [where] public 
ownership and trading are dominated by sophisticated institutional investors”); Goshen & Hannes, supra 
note 9, at 306-308 (endorsing recent “death” of judicial oversight in light of “sophistication” of today’s 
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“increase” and less “sophistication” than often perceived.30 To the contrary, as populist 
shareholder revolts have revealed, the dynamic is more nuanced.31 On the other hand, the Part 
concludes with discussions of the limits of law’s approach to contemporary voting patterns among 
institutional shareholders,32 which can be afflicted by such problems as conflicts of interests and 
inadequate information.33  
 To compensate for these problems while preserving traditional judicial deference to 
shareholder voice, Part III elaborates on the proposed MoQ. Boards wishing to do so can include 
a MoQ as an additional vote, for major transactions, by the segment of a company’s shareholders 
with long holding periods and high investment concentrations.34 This screens indexers and 
transients, whose business models make them most prone to conflicts and least engaged with 
information. Quality shareholders, on the other hand, maintain a business model that creates 
opposite results.35  
 A board would add a MoQ using the methods outlined in the academic literature that 
measures combinations of holding periods and concentration levels.36 The board would use its 
discretion in tailoring eligibility rules to suit, from choosing the minimum holding period to setting 
how to determine concentration.   Holding periods can be determined directly, as share acquisition 
dates are routinely maintained in corporate records.37   
 Determining concentration is indirect, using data in the public filings of institutional 
investors. Measures range from the number of positions an investor owns in its portfolio38 to its 
“active share,” a common expression of deviation from a passive benchmark.39 The board would 
lay out special rules applicable to individual shareholders, whose duration can be readily 
determined but whose relative concentration would require verification. 
 
massive and powerful institutional investors); Lipton, supra note 11, at 318 (“The ostensible rationale 
behind these shifts in standards of review (occasionally stated explicitly, other times left as subtext) is that 
today’s shareholder base is more sophisticated and powerful than the dispersed shareholder base of a 
previous era.”); Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy Lund, Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in Corporate Law, 99 
B.U. L. REV. 1151, 1167 (2019) (“Delaware’s willingness to defer to the shareholder vote, especially when 
the shareholder base contains sophisticated institutional investors, follows corporate law scholarship’s 
emphasis on the importance of sophisticated institutional investors.”).  
30 See infra text accompanying notes 135-154 (noting multiple impairments of institutional 
shareholders in shareholder voting and explaining the diverse strategies and some of their limitations).  
31 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.  
32 See infra text accompanying notes 129-150. 
33 See infra text accompanying notes 151-196. 
34 See infra text accompanying notes 197-221. 
35 Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Case for Empowering Quality Shareholders, 46 BYU L. REV. 1, 
9-30 (2021) [hereinafter Cunningham, The Case for Empowering Quality Shareholders]. 
36 Bushee, supra, note 15; Dallas & Berry, supra note 22, at 538; Cox, Mondino & Thomas, supra 
note 23, at 556-560. 
37 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §219. 
38 Cox, Mondino & Thomas, supra note 23, at 556-560; infra text accompanying notes  104-107. 
39 Martjin Cremers & Ankur Pareek, Patient Capital Outperformance: The Investment Skill of High 
Active Share Managers Who Trade Infrequently, 122 J. FIN. ECON. 288 (2016) (concept of “active share” 
measures relative concentration of a portfolio compared to a benchmark index, with a pure index active 
share equal to zero and a completely concentrated portfolio equal to one). 
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 Even with the clearest board rules outlined, however, expect some wrangling over details, 
particularly whether a given shareholder qualifies for the MoQ vote.40 Such disagreements arise 
regularly in litigation over MoM clauses, including whether certain shareholders might face a 
conflict of interest.41 Experience resolving disputes in MoM settings is a basis for handling similar 
skirmishing for MoQs.  An added advantage: courts repudiate any attempts to game the system, 
such as funds manipulating ownership duration or portfolio concentration. 
 MoQ conditions should hold at least some appeal for all constituents—directors, 
shareholders judges and scholars. By adding a MoQ clause, a board would signal the corporate 
importance of long-term focused shareholders.  Directors have long deployed many tools available 
to sculpt their shareholder base, from corporate communications to dividend policy. The MoQ 
adds a powerful new tool to the toolbox.  The MoQs strategic and tactical appeal will vary with 
context, concerning the vote topic, board composition, shareholder makeup, and corporate 
financial condition.  
 Some shareholders might balk at first, indexers to guard their influence and transients to 
protect arbitrage options. But both cohorts still vote in the usual shareholder approvals, retaining 
power. And if the work of quality shareholders on the MoQ adds value, as fact patterns such as the 
Dell case suggest it likely would, all other shareholders benefit too. Individuals, still owning at 
least one-third of all public equity, and lately exerting considerable power, should also welcome 
the proposal.  
   As a matter of public policy, the MoQ innovation is both modest and bold. It is modest as 
entirely voluntarily, something a board in certain circumstances might find appealing. It is bold 
because it entices deeper thought on weighty questions of the day: how we shape director-
shareholder relations, the tenor of shareholder voice, and the evolution of judicial doctrine. These 
issues are assuming rising importance in light of major changes in director and shareholder 
demographics.  
 Consider widespread concerns about the concentration of power in one class of 
shareholders today: indexers.42  The largest three indexers—BlackRock, State Street and 
Vanguard—manage more than $20 trillion in assets representing at least 20% of public equity 
capital. Another cohort that vexes many observers are short-term traders, likewise commanding a 
substantial portion of market capital that trades frequently. Most recently, the power of this cohort 
manifested in a surprising way, as masses of retail traders drove the price of several speculative 
stocks on volatile rides, raising issues of systemic significance.   
 Indexers and traders play useful roles—market returns for cheap and liquidity for 
instance—and the significance of these phenomenon are debated. But one way to promote stability 
in a system, whether a government or a market, is to have multiple centers of power. In the 
corporate sphere, and capital markets, it is valuable to have a substantial cohort of patient-focused 
 
40 The board could also establish ground rules for how to differentiate between various funds in 
larger fund complexes. More generally, it would help for the to permit shareholders initially excluded from 
the MoQ denominator to submit evidence that they do meet the board’s definition. This Article does not 
dive further into the details of tailoring that would be suitable for a particular board in a specific setting, as 
that is ideally done in context.   
41 See infra text accompanying notes 129-150.  
42 See John C. Coates, IV, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve 
(Sept 20, 2018) (unpublished manuscript) (available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=3247337) (the trend of 
rising power of institutional investors increases the “likelihood that in the near future roughly twelve 
individuals will have practical power over the majority of U.S. public companies.”). 
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shareholders. If they offer an additional center of shareholder power, that would diffuse rather than 
consolidate power. While directors have long used a variety of tools to appeal to such shareholders, 
from communications practices to dividend policy and even shareholder voting, the MoQ 
innovation adds a tool that offers considerable additional advantages. 
 
 
I. DEMOGRAPHICS  
 This Part reviews the evolution of the demographic makeup of the two crucial corporate 
decision makers—directors and shareholders—in the past seventy to ninety years. Boards 
transformed gradually from advisors who were often also corporate officers to monitors who are 
almost always independent of management. Shareholders transformed from being overwhelmingly 
individuals to mostly institutions of various kinds, notably index funds, short-term traders, hedge 
fund activists, and long-term focused investors. Since 2015, however, a slight resurgence of 
individual shares has appeared, some of whom made their power clear in early 2012 by driving up 
the prices of numerous speculative stocks such as GameStop in a frenzy of disruption.43 
 The two groups—not only as legal categories but in terms of their demographic attributes, 
the facts about them—are the principal actors in corporate law.44 For one, boards owe their duties 
to the corporation and its shareholders taken as a whole.  Boards are elected by shareholders and 
subject to removal by them. Boards have plenary power and shareholders are the only other group 
that corporation law statutes recognize as having any voting authority on any matter.  Accordingly, 
shareholder demographics are the relevant legal context in which boardroom decision making and 
shareholder votes occur.   
 
A. Independent Directors 
 Through the 1950s, corporate boards were advisory bodies.45 Members were a CEO’s 
kitchen cabinet. Most were also officers of the corporation. Many were professional advisors or 
had other relationships with the corporation and/or its management.  Today, the opposite is the 
case: almost all are independent, seen as monitors of the CEO, hardly any are officers of the 
corporation or professional advisors.  
As chronicled in Professor Gordon’s magisterial history of the rise of independent 
directors,46 change dates from the turmoil of the mid-1960s through late 1970s. Investigations into 
the Watergate scandal revealed that U.S. corporations made extensive and illicit bribes to foreign 
officials without accurately accounting for them.47 Flurries of SEC consent orders mandated 
 
43 See Reilly supra note 18; infra table 2. 
44 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 
1416, 1416 (1989); Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. 
CORP. L. 33, 81, 92-94 (2006). 
45 See MYLES L. MACE, DIRECTORS: MYTH AND REALITY (1971); Myles L. Mace, Directors: Myth 
and Reality—Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 293 (1979). 
46 See Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 26. 
47 See, e.g., SEC v. ITT Corp., [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶96,948 (D.D.C. 
Aug. 8, 1979); SEC v. Lockheed, [1975-76 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶95,509 (D.D.C. 
Apr. 3, 1976). 
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corporate governance reforms, with an emphasis on installing independent directors.48 This began 
a custom, which continues today, of responding to corporate crisis by looking to independent 
directors. Then, Congress banned such bribes and mandated systems of internal control and books 
and records maintenance to promote faithful financial reporting.49  
 
    
Table 1.  Boards: Towards Independent Directors50 
Joining Congress, in the wake of the bribery scandals, Delaware courts began a decades-
long process of rewarding the use of independent directors.51 Before this time, Delaware courts 
had told directors they had no duty to maintain internal control or to discover misreporting within 
corporations whose boards they occupied.52 In opinions arising out of later derivative litigation, 
however, Delaware courts accorded special deference to decisions of independent directors serving 
on special litigation committees (SLCs) and made this role pivotal to the law of demand futility in 
derivative litigation.53 
Amid a campaign for corporate social responsibility led by Ralph Nader and Joel 
Seligman,54 Melvin Eisenberg focused on variation between state law,55 which said that boards 
were to manage the corporation, and practice, which showed they did no such thing.56 A brilliant 
political compromise resulted in the demise of the advisory board model—seen as non-
functional—and its replacement with the monitoring board and a heightened emphasis on 
 
48 See Arthur F. Mathews, Recent Trends in SEC Requested Ancillary Relief in SEC Level Injunctive 
Actions, 31 BUS. LAW. 1323 (1976). 
49 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §78m(b)(2) (2020)).  
50 Source: Gordon, supra note 26. 
51 See Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 26. 
52 Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125 (Del. Ch. 1963). 
53 Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981); see also Auerbach v. Bennett, 393 N.E.2d 
994 (N.Y. 1979). 
54 See RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN & JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 123-
28 (1976). 
55 MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS (1976). 
56 See MACE, DIRECTORS, supra note 45. 
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independence. Yet no consensus existed concerning exactly what independent directors were to 
do or how independence was to be defined.57 
 The 1980s takeover boom gave independent directors a specific role. Delaware courts, 
continuing a pattern dating at least to the bribery scandal litigation, strengthened the appeal of 
independent directors by increasingly deferring to their decisions.58 Borrowing from the 
jurisprudence on SLCs, courts announced that using independent directors insulated from judicial 
review self-interested transactions,59 cash-out mergers,60 adoption of poison pills,61 resisting 
hostile takeover threats,62 and simply “saying no” to them.63  (These cases are highlighted in Part 
II.)  
By the 1990s, director independence was heralded to solve virtually all corporate 
governance challenges.64 The construct became a routine policy tool used in numerous contexts.65  
Independence was to promote optimal compensation and recruitment, despite directors lacking 
expertise in the relevant subjects. Some promoted “perspective and diversity” on boards,66 which 
may have been considered an expertise in sensitivity toward the interests of other constituencies, 
although no expertise was sought on behalf of traditional shareholder constituencies. State courts 
made use of independent directors irresistible to corporations, giving deference to decisions that 
were widely condemned and hard to defend if made by independent directors.67 
 Despite enthusiasm, empirical research has found little correlation between independence 
and corporate performance.68 Some evidence suggests a board’s independence is less important 
than its active engagement.69 Other evidence suggests that certain kinds of outside directors 
 
57 See Gordon, supra note 26; Donald C. Clarke, Three Concepts of the Independent Director, 32 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 73 (2007). 
58 See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Trouble with Boards (working paper 2005), available at 
http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=801308. 
59 Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400 (Del. 1987); see also Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218 
(Del. 1976). 
60 Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
61 Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).) 
62 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum, Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). 
63 Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). 
64 See Richard A. Epstein, In Defence of the Corporation, NEW ZEALAND L. REV. 707, 719 (2004). 
65 Contexts included compensation disclosure (1992); tax deductibility of certain compensation 
expenses (1995); and application of short swing profit rules (1996). See Clarke, supra note 57, at 95-97. 
66 See Martin Lipton & Jay W. Lorsch, A Modest Proposal for Improved Corporate Governance, 
48 BUS. LAW. 59, 68 (1992). 
67 See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000);  In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative 
Litigation, 907 A.2d 693 (Del. Ch. 2005). 
68   E.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition 
and Firm Performance, 54 BUS. LAW. 921 (1999); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation 
Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. CORP. L. 231 (2002).  
69 See Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Performance of 
the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1283 (1998).   
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improve the performance of certain functions, such as adherence to accounting requirements.70 
But, clearly, there is a trade-off between the expertise of inside directors and the independence of 
outside directors.71   
 Other research counters by pointing to systemic advantages of independent directors that 
redound generally to the benefit of corporations and shareholders alike, such as more accurate 
stock prices and fuller financial disclosure that benefits all enterprises.72 Today, these advantages 
extend to include systemic benefits from board gender and racial diversity as well.73 Yet even such 
perspectives face studies showing weak correlations between independence and specific tasks, 
suggesting yet other possibilities: that nominal independence was subverted by managerial control 
over the appointments process74 or that nominal independence transforms into structural bias once 
an outsider joins a board.75 
 Although of equivocal value and uncertain purpose, director independence is ingrained in 
today’s corporate governance ecosystem.76 Overlapping with the rise of independent directors—
an equally powerful trend—has been the rise of institutional shareholders. These two trends 
together forge the central backbone of corporate governance, as directors and shareholders jointly 
command all of the statutory power corporations are authorized to exercise. It’s even possible that 
perceived limitations in the utility of one lever—say independence directors—may lead to greater 
reliance on the other—with shareholder votes today being the apotheosis of this joint exercise of 
power.  
 
B. Institutional Shareholders 
 In decades past, most shareholders were individuals. In 1965, for example, institutional 
investors held $436 billion of $1.4 trillion in total market capitalization, with nearly $1 trillion 
owned by individual households.77 Less than 15% of the market, or $100 billion, was held by the 
day’s mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies (respectively holding $36, $43, and 
$21 billion 5%, 6%, and 3%).78 
 
70 See Cunningham, Rediscovering Board Expertise, supra note 27. 
71 See Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. CORP. L. 447 (2008). 
72 See Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors, supra note 26. 
73 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Board Gender Diversity: Debate and Practice, 63 CAN. BUS. L. 
REV. 244 (2020); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Racial and Gender Inclusion in American Boardrooms, 
MARKETWATCH (Oct. 23, 2020). 
74 See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, 
and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861, 1867-68 (1995). 
75 See James D. Cox & Harry L. Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations 
and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 (1985). 
76  E.g., ISS Governance, INSTITUTIONAL S’HOLDER SERVS., https://perma.cc/UTL3-WYQB; 
Glass Lewis: Company Overview, GLASS LEWIS, https://perma.cc/3HQC-GSNL. 
 77 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Syst., Fin. Accounts of the United States: Historical Annual 
Tables (1965-1974), http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/20140306/annuals/a1965-1974.pdf. 
 78 Id. See generally Paul Rose, The Corporate Governance Industry, 32 J. CORP. L. 887, 897 (2007) 
(“In 1965, institutional investors held 16% of U.S. equities; by 2001, institutional investors held 61%.”); 
James M. Poterba & Andrew A. Samwick, Stock Ownership Patterns, Stock Market Fluctuations, and 
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 With shareholders so dispersed, prominent corporate theorists had for decades described 
the challenge of corporate life as the “separation of ownership from control.”79 It would be difficult 
for shareholders to act collectively and often irrational for them to incur the costs necessary to 
monitor corporate management.80 In this structure, managers held the balance of power over 
corporate destiny—in American corporate finance, there were strong managers yet weak owners.81 
Corporate law’s principal task, then, was to mitigate the attendant agency costs.82 
 The dominant investing philosophy of the period was to buy and hold stocks, perhaps a 
variety of stocks, as individuals and families have long been wont to do. This was long before the 
concept of indexing had been developed and long before it became easy for anyone to engage in 
rapid-fire day trading of the sort transients would later perfect.83 
 Post-1965, however, trends moved from individual to institutional ownership and, by the 
1990s, those trends had become so powerful that corporate law scholars came to believe that they 
might mitigate these historical problems.84 A promising agenda emerged to enable institutional 
investors to monitor management more effectively.85 Guidance was provided on what to expect, 
including realistic cautionary notes, but in general the rise of institutional investors held out great 
promise for corporate governance.86  
 These hopes, however, have been disappointed, as the rise of institutional investors altered 
but did not resolve the longstanding challenges. Today, institutions command the vast majority of 
 
Consumption, in 2 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY 295, 313 tbl.5 (William C. Brainard & 
George L. Perry eds., 1995) (describing changing pattern of stock ownership during previous three 
decades). 
 79 See ADOLF A. BERLE, JR.& GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE 
PROPERTY (1933). 
 80 See MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION (1965). 
 81 See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN 
CORPORATE FINANCE (1994). 
 82 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
83 See Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Agency Capitalism Activist 
Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 863 (2013) (noting that indexing 
emerged only after the development of modern portfolio theory in the 1970s); Lawrence A. Cunningham 
& Stephanie Cuba, Annual Shareholder Meetings: From Populist to Virtual, FIN. HIS. (Fall 2018) 
(individuals dominated public company equity ownership from the 1940s to the 1980s); PHIL FISHER, 
COMMON STOCKS AND UNCOMMON PROFITS (1958) (popular book advocating what is today called quality 
investing); cf. Ralph K. Winter, On Protecting the Ordinary Investor, 63 WASH. L. REV. 881 (1988) (while 
not purporting to describe actual investor behavior, modeling their functions, including “ordinary” investors 
who buy and hold a moderately diversified portfolio).  
 84 Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990). 
 85  See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for 
Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991). 
 86 See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 
UCLA L. REV. 811 (1992); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional 
Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The 
Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277 (1991). 
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the $30+ trillion in total market capitalization.87 Among these are mutual funds, pension funds, 
and insurance companies together commanding a decisive majority (respectively, $9.1 trillion, 
$2.3 trillion, and $811 billion). They present the old problems of agency costs in new ways due to 
three changes in the institutional investor landscape that have occurred in the past two decades.  
 Foremost, a large and growing percentage of shares are held by indexers. Indexing involves 
buying proportional stakes in every stock listed in some benchmark index, such as the S&P 500 or 
Russell 3000, without doing any research or being exposed to anything but the market risk-return.  
Large indexers command trillions of assets, representing one-quarter to one-third or more of total 
U.S. public company equity. In 1997, less than 8% of mutual funds were indexed, whereas today 
more than 40% are.  A related phenomenon: the rise of proxy advisors to advise these low-cost 
funds on how to vote.88 
 Second is the substantial shortening of average holding periods, indicative of increased 
trading for arbitrage, momentum strategies, and other short-term drivers. The pace of acceleration 
continues with sustained technological advances in computing algorithms, artificial intelligence 
and machine learning.89 Average holding periods shortened significantly from the mid-1960s 
through the early- or mid- 2000s;90 while the average has held steady since, this appears to be due 
to how the shorter horizons of many are offset by the more permanent holdings of the indexers.91  
 Third is the rise of activism. Shareholder gadflies have roamed corporate America since 
the Gilbert brothers popularized the practice in the 1950s.92 And from the 1970s through the 1990s, 
incumbent managers faced constant threats to corporate control from rival firms, takeover artists, 
and colorful raiders.93 But it is only in the past two decades that a vast pool of capital developed 
among specialty firms, dubbed shareholder activists, dedicated to the practice and featuring a well-
developed playbook, a cadre of professional advisers, and repeat players.94 
 A final pivotal cohort with enduring power consists of individual and institutional investors 
who prefer old-fashioned techniques famously known as buy-and-hold. The style is epitomized by 
 
 87 Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Syst., Fin. Accounts of the United States: Historical Annual 
Tables (2005-2015); Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Syst., Fin. Accounts of the United States: Second 
Quarter 2018 at 130. 
88 See Bernard S. Sharfman, The Risks and Rewards of Shareholder Voting, 83 SMU L. REV. 849 
(2020). 
 89 See Tom C. W. Lin, Artificial Intelligence, Finance, and the Law, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 531 
(2019).  
 90 Anne M. Tucker, The Long and The Short: Portfolio Turnover Ratios & Mutual Fund Investment 
Time Horizons, 43 IOWA J. CORP. L. 581 (2018) (through 2000); Paul H. Edelman, Wei Jiang & Randall S. 
Thomas, Will Tenure Voting Give Corporate Managers Lifetime Tenure, 97 TEX. L. REV. 991 (2019). 
 91 K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, and 
Firm Value, 41 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 387, at n. 42 (2018). 
 92 See Cunningham & Cuba, supra, note 83. 
 93 See Knights, Raiders and Targets (J. Coffee, L. Lowenstein & S. Rose-Ackerman eds. 1988).  
 94 See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Introduction to Institutional Investor Activism: 
Hedge Funds and Private Equity, Economics and Regulation 1-38 (2015). 
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Warren Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway.95 Such investors are a throwback to earlier decades, and 
there is a good case that much of the thinking in corporate boardrooms and courtrooms that put 
such significant weight on the shareholder vote had this particular type of shareholder and 
shareholder body in mind.96   
 In the past decade, moreover, individual shareholders are a growing cohort, as trading in 
stocks has become cheaper and easier through a variety of online tools, such as the free trading 
platform, Robinhood. Individual investors often follow a combination of this approach for 
significant parts of their portfolios, while using more diversified or index vehicles for the rest.97 
Others are more prone to short-term trading, as seen in the frenzy of activity in early 2021 
associated with certain speculative stocks such as GameStop. 
 The changes in shareholder demographics since 1950 occurred gradually, but steadily, and 
were a regular and recurring topic of conversation in both formal legal research and informal 
conversation among lawyers and judges. Consider the following periodic graphs of the changes, 
as compiled from Federal Reserve data. 
 
 
 95 See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS: HOW THE BEST MANAGERS 
ATTRACT AND KEEP THEM 2, 4, 34, 44, 119, 173, 195 (2020); Bushee, supra note 14. 
96 See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
97 E.g., AM. ASS’N INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS, https://www.aaii.com (website providing educational 





   Table 2.  Shareholders—Towards Institutions98 
 
 Besides the historical growth of institutions compared to individuals, the composition of 
the institutional cohort warrants segmentation. Institutional shareholders are diverse in their 
investment styles, strategies, goals, and behaviors.  This diversity influences their approach to 
shareholder voting.99 Such attitudes, in turn, influence the weight judges might give to such a vote 
for purposes of evaluating director performance. 
 As the charts above suggest, one way to segment the shareholder universe is by legal or 
descriptive category. These charts delineate mutual funds, government pension funds, and private 
pension funds along with insurance and financial institutions. These could be delineated further 
into subcategories.100 For example, private pension funds may be sponsored either by corporations 
or by labor unions and financial institutions may be either asset managers or hedge funds. Smaller 
but important categories not shown would include endowments and trusts.101 
 But across all such categories, any investor’s strategies and goals ultimately coalesce 
around two vital pivot points that distinguish the variety of shareholders: time horizon and 
corporate conviction, that is average holding periods and portfolio concentration.  The empirical 
research follows this logic. In a famous line of work, Brian Bushee delineated three types of 
shareholders using these two measures: indexer, transient, and quality (he called the latter 
dedicated).102  This work has been influential in many disciplines, such as for optimal securities 
regulation disclosure policy as well as corporate law’s approach to shareholder voting.103 
 An adaptation appears in recent empirical work of Professors Cox, Mondino and Thomas, 
 
98 Source: Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Syst., Fin. Accounts of the United States: Historical 
Annual Tables (2005-2015); Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Syst., Fin. Accounts of the United States: 
Second Quarter 2018 at 130. 
99 E.g., Edwin Hu, Joshua Mitts & Haley Sylvester, The Index-Fund Dilemma: An Empirical Study 
of the Lending-Voting Tradeoff (NYU Law and Economics Research Paper No. 20-52) (Dec. 2020) 
(indexers frequently forego voting shares when they can instead profit from lending shares, as non-voting 
shares, to other parties, such as short-sellers).  
100 See Paul Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in 
Corporate Governance, 2014 BYU L. REV. 1015, 1023-24. 
101 See infra text accompanying notes 135-154 (noting multiple impairments of institutional 
shareholders in shareholder voting and explaining the diverse strategies and some of their limitations).  
102  Bushee, The “Right” Investors, supra note 15, at 29.  
103 This Article will discuss this shareholder segmentation model further in its proposal outlined in 

















who segment standard categories of investors based on time horizon and concentration levels.104 
Time horizons are measured by portfolio turnover and concentration by the number of positions 
in their portfolio. As the following table presents graphically, hedge funds have the shortest time 
horizon while endowments and other traditional buy-and-hold investors have the lowest 
turnover—.105 In terms of concentration, hedge funds are among the more concentrated whereas 
pension funds and mutual funds are the most diversified. 
 Together, the two measures offer a ranking for quality, presented in the following table 
adapted from that study. Retaining investor categories and two measures (portfolio turnover and 
number of positions), this table combines the measures to produce an overall QS ranking on a scale 
of one to ten.106 Clear QSs are endowments, asset managers, and corporations; clear non-QSs are 
pension funds and mutual funds (dominated by indexers) and investment banks and brokerages 











Endowments 1.41 0.29 112 37 
Asset Managers 2.15 0.62 153 2,575 
Corporations 2.42 0.47 195 43 
Hedge Funds 3.82 1.64 118 1,000 
Insurance 4.28 0.42 386 468 
Banks/Trusts 4.67 0.31 436 1,987 
Mutual Funds 5.54 0.49 505 2,777 
I-Banks/Brokerage 6.27 0.74 553 374 
Pension Funds 8.05 0.26 779 321 
Table 3. Segmentation of Institutional Shareholder Universe107 
 These nine shareholder cohorts are diverse. Differences are salient in holding periods and 
concentration levels. Those have implications for the quality of their votes, particularly in terms 
of how informed and disinterested decision-making is. Along with director independence, such 
demographics help understand and assess the jurisprudence of deference that has long 
characterized corporate law.  
  
 
104 Cox, Mondino & Thomas, supra note 23, at 556-560. 
105 Id. at 560. The sample is from 2000 to 2015. 
106 To produce a common size, this converts the authors’ focus figures to a two-place decimal, 
which is then added to the patience figure.  Size is the dollar amount of assets under management (AUM), 
in billions. The original contained a line called “other,” without delineation, so this is omitted. But it is 
clearly QSs, with patience of .43 and focus of 150 for an overall rank of 1.93, with $150 billion in AUM. 
107 Source: adapted from Cox, Mondino & Thomas, supra note 23, at 560. For further illustration 
of members of the leading quality shareholder categories, see infra table accompanying note 184. 
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II. DEFERENCE AND ITS LIMITS 
 
This Part captures how evolving director and shareholder demographics correspond to doctrinal 
evolution in corporate law. Judges experimented with deference to independent directors for many 
years before that cohort came to dominate boardrooms, encouraging the evolution towards 
independent directors. Meanwhile, judges had always encouraged shareholder votes, relying on 
them as a source of validation of director decisions. As a result, practitioners adopted a playbook, 
increasingly standard, of channeling approvals through disinterested directors and shareholders.108  
 It is possible to see recent cases as embracing a more generous degree of deference, and 
attribute this to contemporary shareholder sophistication.109 But while it is true that shareholders 
have become more institutional, as this Part chronicles, judicial validation of shareholder votes 
long predates that rise. Judges have always been concerned about the quality of the shareholder 
vote, particularly that it be independent and fully informed.  The salience of today’s judicial 
deference may instead be due to wider use of the playbook judges have long encouraged. What 
seems most important at this point is the quality of the shareholder vote, the following review 
suggests.110    
 
A. The Venerable Playbook 
 Corporate law vests general power in a board of directors to manage corporate affairs,111   
while requiring a shareholder vote on specific significant matters, mainly director elections, charter 
or bylaw amendments, and extraordinary transactions such as mergers or substantial asset sales.112  
Board power may be constrained by various governance provisions, often stated in the charter or 
bylaws, and are supplemented by longstanding fiduciary duties of care and loyalty.  
 Along with the duty of care is an equally venerable corporate law doctrine, the business 
judgment rule, includes a presumption that directors discharged that duty. After one of the rare 
cases holding directors personally liable for breach of the duty of care despite that presumption,113 
corporate law statutes were enacted to permit charter provisions that limit the personal liability of 
directors for breach of the duty of care.114   
 Corporate law’s other long-settled doctrine, the duty of loyalty, is not covered by either the 
business judgment rule or such exculpation provisions. Directors facing a conflict of interest in a 
transaction with the corporation, rather, bear the burden of proof, in court, that the interested 
transaction was fair to the corporation.115 However, statutory safe harbors dispense with such 
judicial scrutiny, and turn the transaction into one presumed valid under the business judgment 
rule, if approved by disinterested fully informed directors or disinterested fully informed 
shareholders.116   
 The upshot of this doctrinal framework is that corporate planners are well advised to design 
 
108 E.g., WestLaw, Fiduciary Duties in M&A Transactions, PRACTICAL LAW CORPORATE & 
SECURITIES (last visited January 30, 2021). 
109  See sources cited supra note 8. 
110  See Gatti, supra note 10. 
111 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §141(a). 
112 E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §§ 109 251, 271. 
113 Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
114 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §102(b)(7). 
115 E.g., Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400 (Del. 1987). 
116 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §144. 
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transaction procedures to obtain business judgment rule deference while those challenging 
corporate transactions probe for departures from such procedures. This framework readily applies 
to a wide range of recurring corporate decisions, from basic business decisions such as strategy117 
and dividend policy118 at the quotidian end of the spectrum to clear instances of conflict of interest 
at the other, such as an exchange of property between the corporation and a director119 or cash out 
merger at the other.120 
 The framework has been adapted slightly to address peculiar issues that arise in certain 
other categories of transactions where shareholder voice is recognized, particularly cash-out 
mergers orchestrated by a controlling shareholder and decisions resisting or protecting changes of 
control. Even in these more nuanced cases, however, the strategic objectives of the players remain 
the same: corporate planners pursue the route that will result in business judgment rule deference 
while those objecting to a course of action identify lapses in the ordained route to permit judicial 
scrutiny. 
 In all cases, the ordained route is a decision that is made by disinterested fully informed 
directors or shareholders. For corporate law, such exercises of corporate authority deserve judicial 
respect rather than judicial scrutiny or second-guessing. Thus, if approved by a disinterested fully 
informed board and/or shareholder vote, then there are few transactions to which courts apply any 
serious scrutiny. That is certainly true for ordinary business decisions and is even true for more 
fraught settings such as majority cash out mergers or sales of control. In fact, a recent line of cases 
clarifies this stance for such charged settings.121 
 
B. Board Approval   
 
 [A detailed review of the evolving case law that consistently encouraged using independent 
board committees is set forth in the Appendix, and will of greater interest to lawyers and legal 
scholars than to boards or business experts. A summary of the case highlights appears in the 
following chart.]122  (The Quant column presents a fraction, whose numerator is the number of 
independent directors and whose denominator is the whole board size; the Quality column notes 
the judicial assessment of the board’s work and whether it gave deference or not.) 
  
 
117 E.g., Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E. 2d 776 (Ill. App. 1968). 
118 E.g., Kamin v. American Express, 383 N.Y.S.2d 807 (N. Y. Sup. 1976). 
119 E.g., Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 906 A.2d 114 (Del. 2006). 
120 E.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983). 
121 E.g., Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015); Kahn v. M&F 
Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014); Singh v. Attenborough 137 A.3d. 151 (Del. 2016). 
122 This graph is a heuristic for illustration, abstracting away the richness and nuance of the 
discussion and other facts. Yet it is a useful thumbnail sketch of a most pivotal fact in the cases. Spanning 
thirty years, this sample dovetails with Part I.A on the rise of independent directors during that period: from 






Case  Year  Quant Quality   
Weinberger 1985 7/13 at best Incestuous; no deference 
Van Gorkom 1985 5/10 Fast shuffle; no deference 
Moran 1985 10/16 Deference 
Unocal 1985 8/14 or 8/13 Deference 
Revlon 1986 6/16 Compromised; no deference  
Ivanhoe 1989 4/7 Deference 
Time 1990 10/16 Deference  
QVC 1994 11/15 Supine; no deference  
Lyondell 2009 10/11 Deference 
C&J Energy 2014 5/7 Deference 
Table 4: Ten Landmarks on Director Independence 
 
 
C. Shareholder Approval 
 
 Judicial enthusiasm for shareholder approval has a long pedigree, and has been an 
important factor in determining whether to defer to director decisions under the business judgment 
rule or scrutinize them for entire fairness. For instance, the recent Corwin case cites more than a 
dozen Delaware cases giving such credit to shareholder approval, stretching back nearly a 
century.123 Corwin does not delineate such cases in terms of the types of shareholders or prevailing 
shareholder demographics when those votes were held.  
 But a review of the cases indicates that while they never mention shareholder 
“sophistication,” they repeatedly emphasize that shareholders must be informed, disinterested and 
uncoerced. [This detailed review of the evolving case law that consistently encouraged 
disinterested fully-informed shareholder voting is set forth in the Appendix, and will of greater 
interest to lawyers and legal scholars than to boards or business experts. The following discussion 
deals with the recent cases.] 
 The 2014 case of Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp.124 is a culmination of jurisprudence on 
both independent director and shareholder approval, illustrating the venerable playbook in action. 
A controlling shareholder proposed to acquire the rest of the stock. From the outset, it conditioned 
its proposal on two measures now long-endorsed by this long line of Delaware cases: (1) that the 
merger be negotiated and approved by a special committee of independent MFW directors and (2) 
that it be approved by a majority of minority. Both conditions were met, with nearly 2/3 of the 
requisite shares voted in favor. Objecting shareholders lost handily, as those two conditions 
compelled application of the business judgment rule.125 
 Similarly, in the 2015 case of Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC,126 the Delaware 
 
123 Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, n. 19 (Del. 2015). 
124 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014). 
125 Id. 
126 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015). 
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Supreme Court held that an uncoerced, fully informed vote of disinterested stockholders in favor 
of a challenged transaction provided an independent basis to invoke the business judgment rule. 
The court elaborated: 
 . . . the voluntary judgment of the disinterested stockholders to approve the 
merger invoked the business judgment rule standard of review and that the 
plaintiffs’ complaint should be dismissed. For sound policy reasons, Delaware 
corporate law has long been reluctant to second-guess the judgment of a 
disinterested stockholder majority that determines that a transaction with a party 
other than a controlling stockholder is in their best interests. . . . 
 . . . the doctrine applies only to fully informed, uncoerced stockholder votes, 
and if troubling facts regarding director behavior were not disclosed that would 
have been material to a voting stockholder, then the business judgment rule is not 
invoked. . . . 
 . . . When the real parties in interest—the disinterested equity owners—can 
easily protect themselves at the ballot box by simply voting no, the utility of a 
litigation-intrusive standard of review promises more costs to stockholders in the 
form of litigation rents and inhibitions on risk-taking than it promises in terms of 
benefits to them. 
 While some commentators have criticized both M&F and Corwin, often expressing 
surprise,127 judges have long exhorted boards to seek approval of a majority of disinterested 
shareholders. When boards heed such judicial hortatory, credit should follow, not rebuke; 
deference should follow, not review. The business judgment rule only applies, however to such 
shareholder votes that are disinterested, informed (“without full disclosure, ratification would be 
ineffective”) and uncoerced.128 The court returns to a longstanding theme in Delaware: 
shareholders are better than courts to handle such decisions.  Yet what remains open to litigation 
is whether particular shareholder votes qualify as disinterested, fully-informed and uncoerced, and 
there are inherent limits on law’s approach to these issues, as discussed next. 
  
D. Limits of Law’s Ad Hoc Approach to MoMs 
 Delaware law can seem intricate when addressing various corporate transactions such as 
and interested director transactions, cash out mergers, and changes of control. In all cases, 
however, the law puts a premium on director independence and a shareholder vote. For interested 
director transactions, the combination of 144 and Fliegler v. Lawrence129 mean that directors have 
the burden of proving fairness unless, the transaction is improved by either a disinterested full-
informed board committee or a majority the minority (MoM), in which case the standard shifts to 
business judgment rule along with putting the burden on shareholders to assert such unlikely 
claims as waste. 
 For cash out mergers, courts scrutinize the entire fairness of the exchange, as to both 
process and price, with burden of proving both on the directors.  But if approval was given by 
either a disinterested full-informed board committee or a MoM vote, the standard remains entire 
fairness but the burden is shifted to the challenging shareholders. And if the transaction is approved 
by both such a committee and holders, then the standard shifts to business judgment rule along 
 
127 E.g., sources cited supra note 8. 
128 See Gatti, supra note 10. 
129 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).  
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with putting the burden on shareholders to assert such unlikely claims as waste. Even control 
transactions can be simplified in these terms.    
 Yet despite judicial enthusiasm for MoM votes, and despite their utility, they also have 
inherent limitations that entice judicial review. In particular, to obtain favorable review thanks to 
a MoM shareholder vote, Delaware courts are willing to review challenger allegations that the vote 
was not carried by a requisite majority of disinterested, fully informed, uncoerced votes. Related 
inquiries are made on an ad hoc basis. Each of those required features of the vote has a particular 
meaning.  
 Disinterested probes a variety of alleged conflicts, such as other securities or other 
incentives or other needs such as for liquidity; fully informed probes what information the 
company provided, not whether the shareholder digested it. Neither of these would necessarily be 
displaced by a screen for quality, but be additive. For instance, quality screens for likely direct 
ownership conflicts, rather than those more specific contextualized ones, and probes for likely 
shareholder consumption of information rather than examining the corporation’s disclosure of it.  
 To illustrate the ad hoc approach, consider a case involving shareholder voting by a 
shareholder, T. Rowe Price, that owned stock in both a parent and a majority-owned publicly-
traded sub, and was also a lender to the parent.130 The parent planned a tender offer for the sub’s 
public stock, using a special committee of the sub’s board. However, the parent reached out 
directly to T. Rowe Price, which held about six percent of each side’s stock. The majority and T. 
Rowe agreed on a tender offer price and T. Rowe agreed to tender at that price—which helped 
meet the tender offer’s MoM condition.    
 Challengers questioned the vote of T. Rowe Price for purposes of the MoM condition.  
Holding nearly equal stakes in each side, they said, left it hedged and fairly indifferent to the 
allocation of value between the two merger partners. If parent underpays for sub shares in the 
merger, while other sub shareholders would be harmed, T. Rowe, as an equal holder of the parent, 
is not. Tipping the scales, since T. Rowe was also a creditor of parent, it may well have favored its 
side, the challengers claimed.  
 Proponents balked at this proposed judicial examination of shareholder incentives as 
“unworkable and unwarranted.”131 They argued:  
 Sophisticated institutional investors . . . often have diverse holdings that 
could include shares of both parent and subsidiary; they often own derivatives, have 
complex hedging arrangements, possess holdings in competitor corporations, 
and/or have made directional sector bets that could have some conceivable impact 
on their decision to tender. In most cases, Delaware courts will simply have no way 
of knowing the extent of institutional stockholders’ other investments or of 
discerning their true motivations for tendering. 
 The court denied any need to make “generalized inquiries” into investor motivations, 
explaining that the only reason it was considering those of T. Rowe is that the buyer (parent) 
reached out for and got its support, outside the purview of the special board committee of the target 
 
130 In re CNX Gas Corp., 4 A.3d 397 (Del. Ch. 2010). 
131 Id. at 416. 
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(sub). The court wrote: “This case also is not the result of, nor should it be read to encourage, 
generalized fishing expeditions into stockholder motives.”132 
 The court therefore agreed in principle with the limitations of such an ad hoc approach. 
Inquiry followed only after particular transaction facts exposed the potential conflict. Any hidden 
conflicts will remain hidden and outside the courtroom. But if the court is unwilling to accept the 
vote of a conflicted shareholder who self-identifies that way, it is difficult to say why it would be 
willing to accept the vote of a conflicted shareholder in hiding. On the court’s own terms—parent-
shareholder discussion or agreements signaling disqualifying conflict—is also unworkable, as 
such interactions are common and desirable, including in MoM situations, making this trigger 
potentially overinclusive.133   
 The court is clearly, and correctly, averse to permitting fishing expeditions into shareholder 
“motives”—or conflicts, information processing, or sophistication for that matter. What Delaware 
judges in these cases need is a way to provide general screening of voting imperfections. 
Historically, in the case law from the 1930s to the 1990s, this would embrace voting, without 
further inquiry, by the prevalent buy-and-old stock pickers of the day; modernly, this would 
exclude shareholders prone to the numerous frictions in contemporary shareholder voting, 
catalogued next.134 
  
E. Frictions in Shareholder Voting  
 
 Numerous frictions impede the quality of shareholder voting by many of today’s 
institutional investors.135 As reviewed next, these frictions are serious and tend to be slightest for 
shareholders who concentrate their positions and hold for long periods and greatest for those who 
are widely diversified and hold fleetingly. The following summarizes these imperfections and why 
they tend to plague indexers and transients more than quality shareholders. The review points 
directly to the MoQ solution presented afterwards in Part III. 
 Specific Conflicts. Scholars express concern that many institutional investors today own 
shares in so many companies that they will often face conflicts of interest, particularly when two 
companies they own stock in merger.136   In a merger, for instance, suppose a shareholder in both 
companies is entitled to vote on both. If the terms are incontestably fair to both sides, there is no 
 
 132 Id. at 417. The court also rejected arguments to look into T. Rowe’s different funds that owned 
the stock, one of which owned only sub stock, because the agreement was not with the particular funds, but 
with T. Rowe as a whole. At least that was the case on the preliminary record.   
133 Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, supra note 11, at 324; Rock, MOM Approval, supra note 3. 
134 As another case illustration, consider the merger of Zale, which the directors said was 
approved by the vote of a majority of disinterested and fully informed shareholders, 53.1% to be 
exact. In re Zale Corp. Stockholders Litig., Consolidated C.A. No. 9388-VCP, 2015 WL 5853693, at *9 
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2015). Dissenting shareholders challenged both claims, of disinterest and 
information.  The court rejected each challenge. Concerning disinterest, challenges alleged that 
Golden Gate, a 23.3% shareholder (with shares valued at about $225 million) was also a lender 
whose loan would be prepaid in the merger plus a prepayment fee of $3.2 million. Such a conflict 
seemed cognizable to the court, but immaterial, given the numbers 
135 E.g., Cox et al., supra note 23; Sharfman, supra note 88; Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against 
Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. CORP. L. 493 (2018). 
136  Cox et al., supra note 23. 
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problem voting yes on both. But what if the terms are lopsided, clearly favorable to one side? The 
fund could vote yes on one side and no on the other, but that does not so much mitigate the conflict 
as elide it—the fund’s portfolio value is not maximized that way, but by voting yes as the 
shareholder of both, though that is not consistent with the best interests of the losing side.  
 This is a serious problem for indexers and a potentially serious problem for certain 
transients, but rarely one for stock pickers.  Institutional investors diversify their portfolios to 
varying degrees, commonly measured today as relative active share.137 At one extreme, fully-
diversified index funds hold small positions in many hundreds or thousands of companies—all 
those in a given basket, such as the S&P 500 or the Russell 3000. This approach aims to deliver 
the market return at least cost and requires not particular knowledge of any of the companies. 
Indexers will therefore present a high risk of conflict of interest.138 
 Stock pickers, at one extreme, may concentrate on a dozen or perhaps a few dozen 
positions, the latter being enough to obtain the risk-mitigation benefits of diversification without 
impeding the investor’s capacity to study and keep updated on the details of particular 
investments.139 They will therefore face far fewer conflicts. Such a conflict can also arise when a 
short-term oriented investor opportunistically buys stakes in both sides of a pending merger and 
then vote to maximize the value of its portfolio, even if that means voting for a merger that is 
economically foolish for a company.  
 Firm-Specific Information.  Index funds buy every stock in an index, without conducting 
any analysis of any of them. To fulfill their promise of delivering the market return, index funds 
cannot afford to spend resources on monitoring any of those companies either. As a result, index 
funds tend to favor adopting general guidelines about their preferred approaches to a variety of 
corporate topics, such as director qualifications, executive compensation, and shareholder 
rights.140   
 When corporations ask shareholders to vote on particular matters, a passive reference to 
guidelines is common. In fact, recent evidence suggests that indexers increasingly avoid voting 
their shares altogether, as they earn a bit of revenue by lending shares they own to transient short-
sellers, so the shares go unvoted.141 Stock pickers, in contrast, conduct extensive research before 
making an investment and continuously analyze information, and prognostications, over time. 
When it comes time for a shareholder vote, they are likely to be among the best-informed.142 
 
137 See Cremers & Pareek, supra note 39 (“active share” measures relative concentration of a 
portfolio compared to a benchmark index, with a pure index active share equal to zero and a completely 
concentrated portfolio equal to one). 
138 See Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy S. Lund, Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in Corporate Law, 99 
B.U. L. REV.  1151 (2019). 
139 See Michael E. Murphy, Pension Plans and the Prospects of Corporate Self-Regulation, 5 
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 503, 508-09 (2007) (noting that almost all diversity benefits arise in a portfolio 
with as few as 20-30 investments).  
140 See Lund, supra note 135. 
141 See Hu Edwin Hu, Joshua Mitts & Haley Sylvester, supra note 99. This is due to a 2019 SEC 
rule change. Previously, indexers could lend their shares but had to recall them for important votes. The 
2019 SEC guidance allows indexers to lend their shares without ever having to recall them for any votes. 
The result has been a significant increase in indexer lending of their shares on terms that lead the shares to 
to be unvoted.  
142  Cunningham, The Case for Empowering Quality Shareholders, supra note 35, at 17-30. 
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 Advisor Problems. Index investors often minimize operational costs by retaining outside 
advisory firms to advise on how to vote on corporate proposals.143 While the investor is said to 
retain ultimate discretion, the environment poses numerous fissures if not outright conflicts.144 
First, the advisor makes recommendations without usually owning the stock.   Second, the 
recommendations are not always made transparently, some detect systemic biases in them, and 
advisor reps sometimes serve as directors on boards making proposals.145 Third, proxy advisors 
sometimes sell consulting services to corporations covering the exact ground as their 
recommendations—an arrangement creating the appearance that clients pay for services in 
exchange for desired recommendations, despite internal segmentation of these businesses by the 
advisors.  
 Fourth, the advisors have an incentive to persuade a critical mass of client investors to 
subscribe and follow their recommendations, creating incentives to produce a “sense of the 
investment community” on a host of general topics that therefore enter into the shareholder votes 
of particular firms. Such an environment may induce, if not coerce, customers to go along with 
advisor recommendations despite their own better judgment. True, index investor clients of the 
advisory firms remain free and uncoerced in how to vote, but the contexts in which the 
recommendations are generated raises doubt about the integrity of such votes.146 
  Abstract Guidelines. For indexers to meet fiduciary duties requires considerable staff and 
resources that are costly and, for avowed indexers, in contradiction to their business model, which 
is to deliver the market return at least cost. A popular solution is to create highly generalized 
guidelines or even engage a third party that creates a separate similar set of generalized guidelines. 
Such guidelines are criticized on several grounds, including how a preference for general standards 
obscures the important of firm-level needs.147 
 Empty Voting. Contemporary capital market innovations enable numerous ways to 
separate the economic and voting interests in corporate shares.148  When this occurs, those 
empowered to vote lack economic exposure, muting their voice of the meaning that Delaware 
corporate law vests in it as a corporate decision maker. While there is scant public data on the 
frequency or intensity of such practices,149 it is not a strategy associated with long-term 
concentrated shareholders but rather with arbitrageurs, momentum traders, and other transients.  
Accordingly, it may be a concern in particular cases but difficult to claim as a systemic matter.    
  Quality to Transient Drift. Another serious problem is merger arbitrage. This refers to how, 
upon or soon after a merger is announced, a significant portion of quality shareholders sell to avoid 
the risk that a transaction may not close, while a corresponding cohort of transients—short-term 
 
143 See Sharfman, supra note 88. 
144 See Tamara Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry: The Case for 
Increased Oversight and Control, 14 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 384 (2009). 
145 See Cox et al., supra note 23. 
146 See Michael Cappucci, The Proxy War Against Proxy Advisors, 16 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 579 
(2020). 
147 See James R. Copland, David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, The Big Thumb on the Scale: An 
Overview of the Proxy Advisory Industry 7 (Rock Ctr. for Corp. Governance at Stan. U. Closer Look Series: 
Topics, Issues and Controversies in Corporate Governance No. CGRP-72; Stan. U. Graduate Sch. of Bus., 
Research Paper No. 18-27, 2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3188174. 
148 See Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard S. Black, The New Vote Buying: Empty Voting and Hidden 
(Morphable) Ownership, 79 S. CALIF. L. REV. 811 (2006).  
149 Henry T. C. Hu & Bernard Black, Equity and Debt Decoupling and Empty Voting II: Importance 
and Extensions, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 625, 652, 659 (2008). 
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hedge funds engaged in merger arbitrage—buy.  Even quality shareholders who are skeptical of a 
merger’s terms, may nevertheless prefer to cash out than to take their chances of what may unfold 
between signing and closing a transaction.  Merger arbitrageurs earn profits from such trading only 
when the related merger closes. They therefore have every reason vote yes on the merger even if 
quality shareholders would be inclined to vote no.150   
 Priority Conflicts. Another feature of today’s landscape is much harder to deal with: not 
all shareholders are focused on economic gain from their investments. For instance, the pension 
funds of the AFL-CIO advocate shareholder proposals that push a labor agenda.151 The boards of 
public employee pension funds include government appointees and elected officials, all of whom 
respond to politics. Inverting the critical economic thought associated with Karl Marx, labor has 
never controlled so much capital.152 
 All kinds of pension plans pose this problem, of subordinating shareholder interests to other 
interests—labor union plans may side with pro-labor practices even if that reduces shareholder 
returns, public pension plans may cater to political interests, and corporate plans may side with 
their own corporate managers. Structural conflicts arise when a shareholder has incentives to 
appease related parties whose interest might differ from those of the corporation. 
 But while such structural conflicts may be in tension with the idea that corporations are to 
be run for the economic benefit of the shareholders,153 the concept is too elastic to discount 
resulting shareholder votes on that basis. For instance, labor union shareholders can plausibly 
contend that pleasing the workforce is good for shareholders and public pension funds may rightly 
believe that political and corporate interests are aligned. Moreover, federal securities regulations 
put fiduciary duties on such trustees to act in the best interests of their pension beneficiaries, and 
publicly explain how they resolve such conflicts.154   
 With all such imperfections in the capacity of today’s institutional shareholders to cast their 
votes in ways that warrant judicial recognition, what can a corporation—its board and 
shareholders—do, that would continue to warrant such judicial recognition or even heightened 
judicial veneration? Boards can add MoQ clauses to certain consequential shareholder votes, in 
addition to existing statutory or contractual shareholder approval conditions.   
  
 
150  For more on Cox et al.’s version of empirical model, see supra text accompanying notes 105-
106. 
 151 See Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: 
Evidence from Proxy Voting, 25 REV. FIN. STUDS. 187 (2012).   
 152 See DAVID WEBBER, THE RISE OF THE WORKING-CLASS SHAREHOLDER: LABOR’S LAST BEST 
WEAPON (2018). 
153 Crown EMAK Partners, LLC v. Kurz, 992 A.2d 377, 388 (Del. 2010) (Holland J. enc banc): 
[W]hat legitimizes the stockholder vote as a decision-making mechanism is the 
premise that stockholders with economic ownership are expressing their collective view as 
to whether a particular course of action serves the corporate goal of stockholder wealth 
maximization. 
154 See generally William W. Clayton, Public Investors, Private Funds, and State Law, 72 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 294 (2020).    
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III.  SEGMENTATION AND ITS VALUE 
 Corporations count on independent directors and increasingly shareholder votes, either as 
required by statute/charter or volunteered by contract, and whether specified as supermajority, 
majority of the minority or otherwise. But these votes are imperfect. Just as independent directors 
proved equivocal for shareholder value at particular firms (in favor of system-wide advantages), 
elevating shareholder votes to the status of exonerating ratifications may overshoot the mark. Yet 
nor can such a vital route of corporate governance be forsaken or ignored.  
 Boards have longed used MoMs as a part of the corporate approval process, both to add an 
element of fairness and discipline to the process, and to gain judicial deference if sued. Courts 
recognize the appeal and limits of MoM votes but have imperfect tools to assure reliability. Rather, 
they screen on an ad hoc basis for conflicts of interest of particular shareholders, lack of 
information due to inadequate disclosure, or coerced votes. Such an ad hoc approach, however, is 
both costly and imprecise.  
 Refining this approach to zero in on the most patient and focused shareholder group—
QSs—would help. Boards could opt to add a majority of the quality condition (MoQ) in addition 
to the usual statutory voting requirement and any MoM the board might also elect. Boards would 
adapt an academically respected tool that segments the shareholder universe, along the two critical 
dimensions of time horizon and investment concentration. Votes overwhelmingly supported by 
the most patient and focused shareholders—quality shareholders—would warrant presumptive 
effect, but not otherwise.155 
 In this Part, Section A begins in the boardroom, with why directors might wish to attract 
QSs in general, and the social desirability of doing so.  Section B details how a board could do so 
by including QS clauses in some shareholder proposals. For doing so, it presents a recognized 
academic model for segmenting the shareholder base. It uses time horizon and portfolio 
concentration to segment shareholders into three categories—indexers, transients, and dedicated 
shareholders (or quality shareholders).  Indexers are completely diversified although they hold 
indefinitely, transients hold for short periods though they may concentrate their positions, and 
dedicated shareholders are both concentrated and long-term. Section D considers objections.      
 
A. Why Quality? 
 Using a MoQ would equip directors to give a strong clear signal that they value QSs. That 
will appeal to those directors interested in attracting such a cohort, at their current or future 
companies. While some directors, and managers, are content with accepting whatever shareholders 
they get, many consciously cultivate particular shareholder types.156 Evidence shows that 
companies that attract a high density of quality shareholders enjoy many benefits, from intangibles 
such as a longer time horizon to execute on strategy, to measurable economic outperformance 
 
155 An MoQ clause can be used in many ways. For instance, in shareholder litigation challenging 
the reliability or accuracy of a shareholder vote, whether pursuant to statute or by MoM, litigants could 
offer evidence of the voting by shareholder segment, including the QS vote. Judges could weigh such 
evidence in the overall context of evaluating what deference is due.  
156 See Edward B. Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 
849 (2012); Tamara Belinfanti, Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 789 
(2014).    
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compared to rivals.157 The MoQ adds another tool to the kit of directors who wish to sculpt their 
company’s shareholder list.     
 The current toolkit is robust, and the MoQ vote would fortify it. In the current toolkit, the 
most obvious way directors, and managers, cultivate particular shareholder types is through 
tailored corporate communications,158 including a statement of corporate mission expressly written 
to attract certain kinds of shareholders and deter others.159 Directors can deter short-term 
ownership by avoiding emphasis on quarterly earnings and forecasts160 and repel indexers by using 
dual class capital structures.161 Directors targeting QSs can be most effective by mounting annual 
meetings tailored to that cohort162 and annual letters addressed to such shareholders.163 
 When directors set corporate policy on shareholder distributions, they shape the 
shareholder base.164 They choose the portion of earnings to retain or distribute and, if a distribution 
is to be made, whether that is done through cash dividends, share buybacks or spin-offs.165 
Differing tax consequences attract and repel different shareholder types. For instance, cash 
dividends impose a tax on taxable shareholders but not on tax-exempt shareholders whereas 
buybacks make tax implications optional to each shareholder. Directors likewise influence their 
shareholder base by their own level of share ownership in a company.166 
 Shareholder voting rules can also be tailored to cater to desired shareholder cohorts, 
especially time-weighted voting167 that grants enhanced voting rights to a separate class of long-
term shares.168 Directors use these to attract long-term shareholders. Similarly, directors could 
seek to attract QSs by granting enhanced voting power to shareholders based on both long holding 
periods and high portfolio concentration.169 The MoQ is an additional device that may appeal to 
 
157 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Initiative on Quality Shareholders Highlights, C-LEAF 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS (2020), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3697259.  
158 See Usha Rodrigues, Corporate Governance in an Age of Separation of Ownership from 
Ownership, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1822 (2011).  
159 See Henry T.C. Hu, Corporate Governance: Buffett, Corporate Objectives, and the Nature of 
Sheep, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 379, 394 (1987).  
160 See Nadelle Grossman, Turning a Short-Term Fling into a Long-Term Commitment: Board 
Duties in a New Era, 43 U. MICH. J. L. REFORM 905, 915–18 (2010). 
161 See Ron W. Masulis et al., Agency Problems at Dual-Class Companies, 64 J. FIN. 1697 (2009); 
Young Ran (Christine) Kim & Geeyoung Min, Insulation by Separation: When Dual-Class Stock Met 
Corporate Spin-Offs, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 1, 22-29 (2019); Rock, supra note 156. 
162 See Iris H-Y Chiu, Reviving Shareholder Stewardship: Critically Examining the Impact of 
Corporate Transparency Reforms in the UK, 38 DEL. J. CORP. L. 983, 1012–15 (2014); Rock, supra note 
156.  
163 See Michael R. Siebecker, Bridging Troubled Waters: Linking Corporate Efficiency and 
Political Legitimacy Through a Discourse Theory of the Firm, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 103, 144-45 (2014).  
164 See William W. Bratton, The New Dividend Puzzle, 93 GEO. L. J. 845 (2005); Belinfanti, supra 
note 156. 
165 See Edward S. Adams & Arijit Mukherji, Spin-Offs, Fiduciary Duty, and the Law, 68 FORDHAM  
L. REV. 15, 41-50 (1999); York Schnorbus, Tracking Stock in Germany: Is German Corporate Law Flexible 
Enough To Adopt American Financial Innovations?, 22 U. PA. J. INT’’L ECON. L. 541 (2001). 
166 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Director Share Ownership, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 2020). 
167 See Dallas, supra note.  
168 See Patrick Bolton & Frederic Samama, L-Shares: Rewarding Long-term Investors, 25 J. 
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 86 (2013); Belinfanti, supra note 156.  
169 See Cunningham, The Case for Empowering Quality Shareholders.   
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directors seeking to cultivate the QS cohort.  As discussed next, such a vote, in addition to those 
contemplated by statute or MoM clauses, could be a valuable datapoint for all concerned, including 
judges, given limitations on shareholder voting today.  
 
B.  The MoQ Solution 
 The rise of institutional shareholders documented in Part I is often incorrectly conflated 
with the rise of sophisticated investors. In this conflation, omniscient investors rule capital markets 
and invariably know better than others, including courts, what is best. In this portrayal, 
commentators construe Delaware courts as becoming increasingly deferential to shareholder votes 
due to this rise of sophisticated institutional shareholders.  
 But as Part II indicated, there is nothing new about Delaware’s deference to shareholder 
votes and, as the following will explain, today’s institutional shareholders are neither monolithic 
nor omniscient. To the contrary, they are fragmented and diverse, often myopic, conflicted or ill-
informed. If anything, their votes deserve less deference than Delaware judges historically gave 
shareholder votes, because they are quite different from the prevalent shareholder of earlier years, 
before the rising dominance of indexing and arbitrage.  By the same token, individual shareholders 
continue to exert considerable power, and a degree of sophistication, that enables them to outfox 
many institutions often described as “sophisticated.”170 
 Shareholder quality differs, along with how informed, objective, and free shareholder 
voting is. At one extreme, courts could ignore all of this and defer to the certified shareholder vote 
as foreclosing any judicial review of the transaction. At another extreme, courts could probe for a 
particular vantage point of shareholder wealth maximization (an abstraction that cannot be 
verified, is contestable around time horizon, and so on).171 
 In between, a court could use proxies for the kinds of shareholders the case law has long 
envisioned as reliable arbiters, lately articulated in terms of probable information, objectivity and 
freedom.  While many models may be imagined for this probe, a well-known academic model can 
be readily be adapted. Pioneered decades ago by Brian Bushee, the model segments the shareholder 
universe based on time horizon and investment concentration, delineating three cohorts of 
shareholders, indexer, transient, and quality.  
  In the early 1990s, Michael Porter compared investor behavior in the U.S. with Germany 
and Japan, whose economies were more productive.172 He reported a U.S. propensity toward 
indexing or trading compared to the more concentrated and patient investor prevalent abroad. In 
the late 1990s, Brian Bushee extended Porter’s analysis.173 Bushee noted that Porter’s critique 
overlooked the significant group of U.S. investors who both concentrate and hold. But he stressed 
 
170 See supra text accompanying note 18. 
171 See Lipton, Shareholder Divorce Court, supra note 11. 
172 Michael Porter, Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in Industry, 5 J. APP. CORP. 
FIN. (1992).  
 173  Bushee, The “Right” Investors, supra note 15, at 29.  
30 
 
that Porter’s insight warranted focusing on differences among shareholders represented by two 
variables: time horizon and conviction.174 
 In segmenting investors as indexers, transients or quality (Bushee called the latter 
dedicated), Bushee’s empirical work computed various measures of horizon and conviction: 
horizon by quarterly portfolio turnover as well as portion held more than two years and conviction 
by average percentage ownership of investees, the percentage of investees representing at least 5% 
of the portfolio, and the average size of each.175  He then combined the horizon and conviction 
computations to capture the two factors together.   
 Bushee clustered the results into the three shareholder types and identified exemplars of 
each. Transients, with short time horizons and small stakes, are typified by Numeric, a fund that 
exploits dynamic stock market activity, not fundamental analysis of business; quasi-indexers, 
which buy small stakes in 500 to 3000 stocks representing a market basket, is exemplified by 
CalPERS, the California pension fund; and quality shareholders, those who buy large stakes and 
hold them for long periods, are epitomized by Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway, he said.176   
 Professor Bushee’s work has been influential. Decades after publication, consulting firm 
McKinsey & Company offered a similar take.177 It calls equivalent categories by different names: 
intrinsic instead of dedicated; mechanical instead of quasi-indexers; and traders instead of 
transients. But the analytical utility of the McKinsey and Bushee lexicons are the same and offer 
a valuable lens for purposes, especially their expected handling of information and likelihood of 
different shareholder cohorts being informed participants in shareholder voting.  
 In finance scholarship, numerous empirical studies identify shareholders who rank high by 
combined horizon duration and portfolio concentration. Paul Borochin and Jie Yang developed 
such a database to determine the effects of shareholder base on a company’s governance structure 
and economic value.178 Martjin Cremers and Ankur Pareek created a large data set of all 
institutional investors dating to 1980, presenting, quarter-by-quarter, each shareholder’s 
concentration and average holding period.179  
 Most people can reel off the most prominent indexers—often dubbed the “big three,” of 
BlackRock, State Street and Vanguard. Exemplars of quality are Berkshire Hathaway, Capital 
 
 174 Id. 29-30 (using the words stability and stakes rather than horizon or conviction but 
synonymously).  
 175 Id. at 29-30. 
 176 Id.  
 177 Robert N. Palter et al., Communicating with The “Right” Investors, in McKinsey on Finance: 
The Enduring Value of Fundamentals, 40 MCKINSEY & CO. 57, 58-59 (2011). 
 178 Paul Borochin & Jie Yang The Effects of Institutional Investor Objectives on Firm Valuation 
and Governance, 126 J. FIN. ECON. 171 (2017) (including a robust propensity score model to identify 
quality shareholders, dubbed DED for dedicated, after Bushee, in the model).  
 179 See Cremers & Pareek, supra note 137.  The private sector increasingly generates data analytics 
that classify shareholders based upon holding periods and concentration levels. That is the business, for 
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See https://www.eqxse.com.  
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Research, and Tweedy Browne; and the epitome of transients are AQR, Sun Trading, and 
Tradebot.180  The following table presents examples in each category that appear in the literature.181 
 
Quality Transients Indexers 
Berkshire Hathaway 
Capital Research & Mgmt. 
Jennison Associates 
Fidelity Mgmt. & Research  
Harris Associates (Oakmark) 
State Farm 












Table 5. Exemplars of Principal Shareholder Segments182 
  To illustrate the quality category further, the following table graphs 25 top-ranked 
portfolios by a combination of high commitment (holding period) and high concentration. Observe 
that quality shareholders in this ranking are members of the categories of investors that tend to 
rank high for quality as shown earlier in Table 3.183  Among the larger members of this grouping, 
the Endowment category is represented by the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation; Asset Managers 
by Capital Research Global Investors; Corporations by Berkshire Hathaway; Hedge Funds by 
Pershing Square; Insurance companies by State Farm Insurance. 
 
Table 6. Top Quality Shareholder Portfolios 184 
 
 180 For a detailed treatment, multiple lists, and tests of the policies and practices that attract different 
shareholder types, see Lawrence A. Cunningham, Initiative on Quality Shareholders Highlights, C-LEAF 
OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES (2020), available at https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=3697259. 
 181 Borochin & Jie Yang, supra note 178; CUNNINGHAM, QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS, supra note 95, 
at 176. 
 182 Source: Borochin & Yang, supra note 178. 
 183 See supra text accompanying note 107.   




 In legal scholarship, Belinfanti features Bushee’s method prominently, describing it as a 
“contemporary” method to “drill down” beyond conventional classifications to focus on important 
behaviors and propensities.185 Dallas and Berry use Bushee’s classification system in empirical 
work on shareholder voting regimes, stressing the particular importance in shareholder voting of 
time horizons and concentration levels.186  
 As noted, in the current debate over Delaware’s judicial review of board decisions that are 
approved by a shareholder vote, the empirical research of Cox, Mondino and Thomas examines 
time horizon and concentration levels across a variety of formal investor types, such as 
endowments, asset managers, and pension funds.187 In turn, that work is modeled on such a method 
that is widely recognized in the finance literature. All are akin to the Bushee system’s focus on 
time horizon and concentration levels.  
 As another example, Sampson and Shi drew upon Bushee’s classification, finding evidence 
that transients have a greater presence and quality shareholders (dedicated) a lesser presence over 
the period from 1980-2013.188 These observations take into account both time and conviction.  
Cremers and Sepe explain that accounts in the legal literature tend to present investors in 
“dichotomic” terms, as always short-term or always long-term, while the truth is more complex, 
requiring “a more exact taxonomy of institutional investor behavior: that includes time horizons 
and conviction levels.189  
* * * * * 
  When it comes to shareholder voting, the Bushee categories are especially useful, because 
they are probative of the things Delaware courts have always signaled are important.190  Quality 
shareholders were the dominant cohort from the 1940s to the 1980s—the period before either 
indexing or day trading emerged—when Delaware so exuberantly embraced shareholder voting’s 
power to help boards avoid scrutiny of their decisions.191  
 Since then, Delaware courts have emphasized being disinterested and informed, again 
hallmarks of the quality shareholder. These traits are unlikely to be applicable to indexers, whose 
ownership of virtually every company presents conflicts and whose low-cost business model limits 
the capacity to be informed. Nor do they tend to characterize transients, for whom information 
costs are high and for many, especially arbitragers around mergers, creates conflicts.  
 Institutional shareholders should not simply be presented generally as sophisticated but 
segmented into particular traits relevant to a particular context. They may or not be sophisticated 
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in any sense relevant to reliable shareholder voting—at least for the specific purpose of judicial 
deference to a board’s decision-making. It is fair to say that institutional shareholders, as a group, 
alter the traditional “rational apathy” problem that plagues individual shareholders to something 
like a “rational reticence” problem.192 It is true that certain types of institutional shareholders pose 
particular sorts of new problems, such as public pension funds with political conflicts, union 
pension funds that might promote labor goals over shareholder goals, arbs with skewed incentives, 
indexers and other cross-holders with conflicts.193   
 It is not safe to say that institutions are invariably more sophisticated than individuals. 
Many individuals are more sophisticated than many institutions.  My research has identified 
dozens of sophisticated individual QSs, including luminaries, past or present, such as Ron Baron, 
Warren Buffett, Mellody Hobson, John Maynard Keynes, and Meryl Witmer.194 Most people could 
name plenty of inferior institutions; a good list starting with Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers195 
and followed by a dozen more, such as Countrywide, Deutsche Bank J.P. Morgan, Merrill Lynch, 
Morgan Stanley, Washington Mutual and Wells Fargo,196 plus Bank of America, Citigroup, 
Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley and UBS.197 Add to this list the short-sellers pummeled by 
masses of individual traders through Reddit platforms and RobinHood apps: Citron, Melvin 
Capital, and Point72.198 
 Institutional investors adopt diverse philosophies, many pivoting around time horizon and 
concentration. Indexers buy the market, intending to hold forever, and believe that markets are 
efficient. Transiens time the market, eking gains from inefficiencies. Neither is a regular consumer 
of proxy statements and other shareholder information that companies produce.199 In contrast, that 
is the daily diet of quality shareholders.200 Transients never hold for long, by definition, while 
indexers always sell when a stock is removed from the index; the favorite holding period of quality 
shareholders, to quote Buffett, is forever. 
 Professor Lipton summarizes: 
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the same sophistication and diversification that justifies increasing reliance on the 
shareholder vote also gives rise to conflicts that make the shareholder vote an 
imperfect measure of the advisability of a proposed action across all equity holders. 
Delaware courts are trapped in an ouroboros: even if it were possible to tease out 
all of the myriad conflicts these entities face (a likely impossible task), to do so 
would leave the smallest, and least sophisticated, shareholders to approve deals, 
which would undermine the basis for relying on their votes to avoid judicial 
scrutiny in the first place.201 
The quality approach avoids this problem. To the contrary, by diminishing the power of indexers 
and transients, the focus is on the highest quality shareholders, justifying rather than undermining 
this reference to shareholder votes. 
 
C. Objections 
 Ready objections to this proposal would challenge the distinctive weight placed on time 
horizon and concentration. Why do these factors warrant such emphasis?  After addressing both, 
this section considers implementation challenges.  
 
1. Time Horizon  
 This objection can made as a matter of theory and empirics, policy and law. As a matter of 
theory, corporate law professors have for decades engaged in an unresolved debate over 
shareholder time horizons. Some critics challenge the shareholder value maximization norm 
because short-term shareholders pressure managers for short term results with related evidence of 
earnings management202 while others cite evidence of short-termism to demand that corporations 
take greater social responsibility.203 On the other side of the debate, many corporate law scholars 
find evidence of short-termism too limited to warrant substantial legal or policy changes.204  
 Resolving that debate is not necessary to weigh the import of a shareholder vote that 
consists of shareholders with a wide range of holding periods in a particular company’s stock (or 
proxied by their overall portfolio horizon). It is defensible to believe that short-term owners will 
vote according to short-term interests, whether or not that is optimal or profit-maximizing for the 
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corporation and its shareholders taken as a whole.205 It is true that activists motivated by short-
term must persuade a critical mass of others, if those are mostly indexers rather than activists, the 
result does not negate the critique.206   
  Turning to policy, skeptics might ask in what other contexts shareholder time horizons are 
taken so seriously. Why punish newly-acquired shares, for instance, of a holder with the intention 
of holding forever? One close analogy is to private voting rules of a dozen public companies that 
have experimented with tenured voting, usually granting enhanced voting power to shares held 
more than four years.207  
 In public law, three years is the time frame used in Delaware’s corporate statute limiting 
business combinations with interested shareholders208 as well as in SEC rules regulating the 
making of shareholder proposals.209  One year is the longstanding dividing line for capital gains 
tax treatment under federal income tax law.210 Each of these is tailored to the particular context 
and are ex ante rules; judicial presumptions to aid judges in determining what deference is due to 
boards in light of shareholder votes is inherently flexible for litigants and judges to gauge in the 
particular case.  
 Delaware courts have repeatedly said that directors may segment the shareholder base in 
such ways, with a frequent focus on holding periods, especially short ones.211 For example, as  
bidding rose in the battle waged by Air Products for control of Airgas, many Airgas shareholders, 
including some quality shareholders, sold.212 With almost half the remaining shares in the hands 
of transients, the Airgas board expressed concern that they would simply accept the $70 bid despite 
the company’s greater long-term value.  
 When Airgas’s board tried to thwart the Air Products bid, a court battle ensued. Despite 
some skepticism—noting that many long-term holders had sold to the transients—the judge agreed 
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with the board. After all, the judge noted, Air Products’ own experts had acknowledged that many 
transients would sell at $70, even if they thought AirGas’s long-term value was greater.213 
 In short, while transients may cast their lot according to immediate cash values, QSs take 
the long view. They always consider and generally support valid management plans over multiple 
time periods, giving due consideration to building value. If boards, such as Airgas, can consider 
transient dominance to defeat hostile tenders offers, they certainly can evaluate how their ordinary 
business judgments shape the shareholder base. 
 
2. Investment Conviction    
 A second objection asks why portfolio concentration in a given stock is probative. Some 
argue that the larger indexers command vast economies of scale and scope to grasp issues quickly 
across many diverse companies.214 Others contend that their incentive to increase AUM alone 
suffices to assure casting informed votes—the greater a company’s market capitalization, the more 
AUM indexers own in it, and the higher their fees,.215 They emphasize substantial behind-the-
scenes avenues of engagement outside the limelight.216 They point to how the largest three have 
publicized their decisions to increase their stewardship staff, even doubling headcount in one case. 
 Critics questions these assertions.217 Concerning maximizing AUM, of course, it is not in 
the interests of shareholders simply to grow—retaining and deploying earnings in suboptimal 
projects does that while hurting shareholders. At many companies, shareholders are best served 
not by increasing size but by dividends, buybacks, divestitures, spin-offs and other techniques that 
reduce rather than increase corporate size.218  
 As troubling for supporters is the small staff size—even after the vaunted increases—in 
relation to the number and size of companies to be followed. Among largest indexers: BlackRock 
doubled its stewardship staff to 45; Vanguard has 21; and State Street 12. Yet these indexers have 
holdings in more than 11,000 companies each worldwide, and at least 3,000 in the U.S. alone. 
They cast votes at more than 4,000 annual meetings adding up to more than 30,000 proposals. 
 Put in dollar terms, total stewardship investment is about $13.5 million, $6.3 million, and 
$3.6 million, respectively, all less than one-fifth of 1%– only 0.2%—of total fees and expenses. 
Even if the staff focused only on the largest companies—say where their stakes exceed $1 billion, 
which still adds to hundreds—they could only devote two to four person-days per year studying 
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 BlackRock Vanguard SSGA 
Stewardship Staff        45       21      12 
Investees Worldwide 11,246 13,225 12,191 
Investees U.S.   3,765   3,672   3,117 
Maximum Person Day    <4 <2 <2 
Stewardship Expense $13.5 million $6.3 million $3.6 million 
Total Fees & Expenses  $9.1 billion $3.5 billion  $2.6 billion 
Table 7. Index Fund Engagement Resources 
 
 For context, consider the head count at two other companies involved in investment 
analysis. Moody’s, the bond rating agency covering a large swath of capital markets, employs 
12,000 people. Among the largest quality shareholders, Capital Research, which keeps up with a 
far smaller portfolio of companies, 7,500. 
 Even assuming vast economies of scale or scope and motivation to boost AUM, it is hard 
for many to believe that such limited resources suffice to yield informed opinions on the tens of 
thousands of shareholder decisions required of an owner of shares in many thousands of 
companies.  While many decisions are quotidian, at least a significant portion would require some 
knowledge that would entail reading the annual report and proxy statement, determining the 
company’s strategic plan and past performance, components of its executive compensation plans, 
and pending shareholder and management proposals. Yet the evidence indicates that the big 
indexers even access only 29% of governance related public filings of their investees.220  
 When it comes to so-called private engagement, the probabilities and public record point 
to inherent limitations. From 2017 through 2019, the largest indexers reported having multiple 
annual engagements with only a handful of their investees—3.9% at Blackrock, 2.3% at Vanguard, 
and 0.6% at State Street; they had just one engagement with another 7.2%, 3.5%, and 5.0%, 
respectively.221 In other words, over a recent three-year period, these firms had no engagement 
with the overwhelming majority of the companies they invest in.  
* * * * * 
 Beyond the largest indexers, the smaller ones are influenced by the centralized voting 
recommendations of the two large proxy advisory firms, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS) 
or Glass Lewis. The two oligopolists, one owned by private equity the other by two large Canadian 
pension funds, operate with lean staffs on low budgets. With just 1,000 employees at ISS and 1,200 
at Glass Lewis, they cover a huge market: ISS boasts 1,700 institutional clients while Glass 
Lewis’s clients together manage $35 trillion in assets.222 Their small crews opine on hundreds of 
thousands of separate decisions annually—ISS addresses 40,000 annual meetings and Glass Lewis 
20,000.223   
 Measuring the exact influence of ISS and Glass Lewis is difficult, since some investors 
might vote the same way anyhow. But estimates range from swaying 6% to 33% of any given vote, 
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significant considering that many are decided by small margins. Evidence also shows that 
institutional investors are substantially more inclined to vote for proposals that advisors support 
than oppose—by margins ranging from 16-27% on executive compensation to 64-73% on 
directors in contested elections.224  
 Two forces propelled proxy advisors to such prominence. The rising popularity of low-cost 
index fund investing has made it too expensive for indexers to do independent research. That stokes 
rising market demand. Since 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission has let institutional 
investors meet their fiduciary duty to adopt and disclose proxy voting guidelines by relying on 
advisors. That created a governmental license for such firms, a recipe for market failure.   
 Under this government-sanctioned system, indexers not only avoid homework and 
responsibility for stock selection but for voting decisions. As indexers pushed their fees towards 
zero, they shifted from traditional market competition based on price to a novel form of 
competition based on virtue signaling: they woo customers by stressing social and environmental 
factors in their voting preferences. While advisors disclose little about how they develop their 
guidelines, they do stress surveying such indexer appetites.   
  
3. Implementation    
 For directors, the concept of the MoQ is inherently appealing because it is optional. For 
certain directors, it will appeal because the quality cohort tends to be the most valuable cohort to 
promote long-term corporate interests.225 More cynically, MoQ approval adds weighty evidence 
supporting deference to their decision if dissenting shareholders challenge it.  
 Yet directors might be concerned that asking for a QS vote signals that they are uncertain 
about the proposal or their role in betting it.  But if the condition were made at the outset, before 
finalizing the proposal, this concern should disappear. Even if added at the end, a board can simply 
explain the value of the additional step in the deal approval process.   
 Directors must stand for election with votes cast by all shareholders. With majority rules, 
directors cater to the majority of the whole, not majority of segments.  Accordingly, directors will 
opt for a MoQ only when they believe that the majority of the whole would concur with holding 
such a step.226 Shareholder views may depend on the topic, the board, the shareholder list, and the 
company.  
 For instance, an MoQ may have greatest appeal on the topic of dividend policy, with a 
board that includes significant share ownership, a shareholder list that is most taxable, and a 
company with a good track record of capital allocation; at the other extreme might be a vote on 
defensive measures (such as poison pills and staggered boards), a board viewed as unduly 
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deferential to management, a shareholder list that includes activists, and a company that 
persistently underperforms.  
 For votes involving transactions with third parties, such as mergers, the other side will treat 
an MoQ condition as an additional risk that the deal will not proceed. Some may view such a 
condition as likely to lead the board to negotiate for a superior deal. That might influence opening 
bids in a negotiation, a buyer offering a lower starting bid, for instance, anticipating the need to 
add more later.  In some cases, such parties might balk at the prospect that some of the 
shareholders, rather than the board, have the last word on a transaction.  
 On the other hand, each of those three points arises for any shareholder vote, including 
MoM conditions. True, there is incremental closing risk, a chance for altered opening bids, and 
resistance to proceeding, but directors should be able to meet these concerns. For instance, they 
can assure the other side that they would not opt for an MoQ if they had doubt about its prospects 
and therefore be able to offer assurances that dampen if not eliminate the desire to bid low or resist 
proceeding. Moreover, all such issues arise in all contexts where participants include deal 
protection clauses that run the risk of being invalidated. In other words, these are familiar problems 
that participants routinely anticipate, negotiate and price.  
 Finally, the MoQ would appeal most to boards prepared to signal the corporate importance 
of long-term focused shareholders. They would also have to be prepared to face challenges that 
might be mounted by other shareholders, and explain to the advantages to them of such a vote. 
The principal risk would be objections of powerful political groups in corporate governance, 
particularly indexers and transients.   
 While quality shareholders may welcome an MoQ in a given case, indexers and transients 
may well object, as might those who anticipate taking new opportunistic positions in companies 
announcing transactions, such as mergers, requiring a shareholder vote. There are several 
responses. 
 First, how much weight to give such objections will vary by company and transaction and 
given boards, involved in a particular deal, would decide whether an MoQ was appropriate in the 
circumstances. These deal-specific and contractual features distinguish the MoQ from other 
alternative voting arrangements, such as dual class or tenured voting, which are preset for all votes 
of designated types in corporate charters or bylaws.227 
 Second, such objections can only be partial, as the voice of all shareholders is still heard in 
the required statutory approval as well as any MoM vote; their voice is squelched only in the 
potential veto vote of the MoQ.  Again, this is unlike other alternative voting arrangements, such 
as dual class, which draw criticism for permanently muting the voice of non-founder shareholders 
and eliminating managerial accountability.228 An MoQ produces no such effects.  
 Third, the logic that justifies MoM exclusion of interested shareholders, while including 
transients and indexers, applies to the MoQ exclusion of non-quality shareholders as well: to 
minimize voting imperfections. If disinterested indexers and transients consider MoM votes to be 
a valid exercise of corporate power, consistency would require upholding MoQs as well.   
 Moreover, all shareholders would benefit from the MoQ in two ways. First, they stand to 
gain by free riding on the effort QSs tend to invest in research and monitoring their investments. 
Second, even shareholders who generally vote no, or in in a particular case, benefit because MoQ 
approval provides an additional way to challenge a vote in court. For instance, if the MoQ is not 
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met, as the quality shareholders voted no, courts have less reason to defer, even if a majority of 
the minority approved.   
  Finally, worth noting is that shareholders wishing to circumvent the rule would face 
significant costs to do so. For instance, in a merger, absent such a clause, QS may sell to merger 
arbs, who hold the vote and bear the risk that the merger does not close. That’s part of the point of 
the MoQ, and something that would keep QSs interested in continuing to hold.  In order to 
undermine this intent, those interested in selling would have to enter into a futures contract with 
the prospective buyer, in which the seller agrees to vote for the merger and both agree to transfer 
the shares after the merger closes.229 
 In court, judges would continue to apply all existing doctrines as before, using this 
additional feature prudentially to inform their ultimate judgment. Directors must calculate 
probable outcomes when deciding to include the condition or not in a particular resolution. That 
would induce attention to the appetites of the quality shareholder. In short, for judges, MoQ votes 
would provide an additional valuable data point to help them reach difficult judgments about what 




 Imagine how a MoQ would have changed the outcome of the Dell going private transaction 
mentioned in the Introduction. An independent board committee needed to push back against a 
controlling shareholder. Its principal leverage was the hurdle of obtaining a majority of the 
minority shares.  It cleared that hurdle by a hair. The winning voting side included the pre-existing 
index owners as well as a substantial inflow of transients.  Had the committee faced an additional 
hurdle of a majority of the quality shareholder vote, it would have either pushed back harder to 
give them a better deal or have failed to win the vote.  
 A MoQ vote both preserves the voting franchise of all shareholders, while adding a higher 
quality vote of shareholders that do not face the systemic problems that diversified indexers and 
short-term transients face. One problem is staying fully informed. Indexers face serious constraints 
on their ability to process information on the tens of thousands of votes they must cast annually. 
They may snap to attention for some high-ticket mergers, but their low-cost business model means 
small budgets and lean staffs.  Transients, meanwhile, tend to prefer market calculations to 
business information. 
 Another problem concerns conflicts of interest. Indexers buy shares in virtually every 
public company, often owning shares in both sides to a deal, such as a merger. Even if merger 
terms are unfair to a buyer, therefore, indexers reap offsetting gains on the seller side and approve 
the buyer’s proposal anyway. Transients pounce when mergers are announced, many taking 
multiple positions so that their best outcome is for the merger to close, whichever side terms favor.   
 By adding a MoQ clause, a board would signal the corporate importance of long-term 
focused shareholders. Other shareholders might balk at first—indexers to guard their influence and 
transients to protect arbitrage positions. But both should come around, when they understand how 
the separate vote of the quality shareholders adds value. 
 As for practical implementation, segmenting the shareholder list for quality is easier than 
one might imagine.  Researchers use a respected technique based on a combination of holding 
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periods and concentration levels. Boards use discretion in tailoring eligibility rules to suit, from 
choosing the minimum holding period to setting how to determine concentration.  
 There may be incremental costs to adding an MoQ clause, defining eligibility, 
administering the vote, addressing borderline cases, and litigating all of this. But these are the same 
costs associated with MoM clauses, and the MoQ benefits from shareholder protection would 




APPENDIX A: BOARD APPROVAL 
 
 Doctrine and practice always evolve. Interested transactions were once void. Then they 
gradually became voidable. One route was approval by disinterested directors. But that was far 
from automatic, at least early on and at least in certain settings. 
 
1. Early Exploration (1940-1980) 
 In early modern Delaware corporate law, judges rarely excused conflicts based on the 
approval of disinterested directors.230 But as early as 1960, when most shareholders were 
individuals and just 20% of directors were independent, Delaware courts began to grant legal 
significance to director status.231  
 During the 1970s, independent directors gradually began to appear in corporate 
boardrooms, moving from 25% in 1965 to 40% by 1980.232 They made a difference in court. For 
instance, a board with a majority of outside directors (five of nine) won judicial deference in Puma 
v. Marriott.233 In a contrasting landmark, Sinclair Oil v. Levien,234 where no independent directors 
were present, they had the burden of proving the fairness of a decision that appeared to benefit the 
parent in a way that did not benefit the minority. 
   Accordingly, while courts in the 1970s had begun to recognize director independence as 
a reason to apply business judgment rule deference to a board decision,235 before the 1980s director 
independence was not routinely stressed as an ideal. After all, through this period, the vast majority 
of directors were also corporate officers.236 But changes were afoot, seen in a statutory innovation 
to address the persistent challenge of interested director transactions.237  
 At early common law, many courts held that transactions between a corporation and its 
directors were void.238 The duty of loyalty prohibited them. But this strict rule prevented 
corporations from entering into a wide range of advantageous deals. Later courts relaxed that 
stance to render such transactions voidable, meaning not automatically disallowed, but could be 
 
230 The classic example arose concerning breach of the duty of loyalty by usurping a corporate opportunity. 
In Guth v. Loft, 5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1939), the Delaware Supreme Court admonished: 
 Corporate officers and directors are not permitted to use their position of trust and confidence 
to further their private interests. . . . The rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty 
to the corporation demands that there be no conflict between duty and self-interest.  
231 In Beard v. Elster, 160 A.2d 731 (Del. 1960), the Court of Chancery wrote: 
 We think the fact that a disinterested Board of Directors reached this decision in the exercise 
of its business judgment is entitled to the utmost consideration by the courts in passing upon 
the results of that decision. 
 232 See supra text accompanying notes 45-51. 
233 283 A.2d 693, 695-96 (Del. Ch. 1971) (“since the transaction complained of was accomplished 
as a result of the exercise of independent business judgment of the outside, independent directors whose 
[sole] interest was the furtherance of the corporate enterprise, the court is precluded from substituting its 
uninformed opinion for that of the experienced, independent board members . . .”). 
234 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971). 
235 Gimbel v. Signal Cos., 316 A.2d 599, 609-10 (Del. Ch. 1974), aff’d, 316 A.2d 619 (Del. 1974) 
(applying business judgment rule to valuation in sale of assets where “arm’s length bargaining marked the 
transaction and the vote of interested directors was not necessary to approve the transaction”). 
236 See supra text accompanying notes 45-50. 
237 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §144. 
238 See CUNNINGHAM, CORPORATIONS, supra note 28,at 470-71. 
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challenged or sustained based upon a judicial assessment of their fairness to the corporation. The 
burden of proving fairness was on the directors and the business judgment rule did not apply.239 
 Due to continued perceived rigidity, state adopted interested director transaction statutes.240  
These authorize internal corporate procedures to approve interested transactions to protect them 
from judicial rebuke, typically by disinterested and fully-informed director or shareholder 
approval. If directors can demonstrate meeting the statutory requirements, then the transaction 
enjoys a safe harbor from judicial review as to claims of conflict of interest.241  
 These statutes reflect a dominant corporate law motif: rules that channel corporate decision 
making into board rooms (and shareholder meeting rooms) rather than courtrooms.242 This motif 
became the explicit exhortation of Delaware judges during the 1980s and 1990s. 
 
2. Explicit Exhortation (1980s-1990s) 
 The 1980s ushered in a process-based emphasis on board information and independence.243 
While jettisoning some old doctrine, particularly the requirement that defendants show a proper 
business purpose,244 the old chestnuts remained important on the issue of director independence.245 
 The transcendent case of this period is Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.246 A cash out merger by a 
50.1% parent with the sub, and parent calling all the shots. The sub’s board had 13 directors, six 
of whom were designated by the parent from among its officers, directors or advisors, and the 
parent had installed the sub’s CEO, a long-time parent executive, who served on both the sub and 
parent boards.247  
 Two common directors, beholden to the parent, used the sub’s resources to determine their 
highest price (up to $24 being a “good investment”). The sub president responded to the parent’s 
bid by saying it “generous.” A hurried process—with no negotiations—ensued. Both boards 
approved the merger in a joint meeting featuring overlapping directors and no effort to involve any 
independent directors—and no mention of the common directors’ study, though they attended the 
meeting. 
 The Delaware Supreme Court rebuked this process, urging both sides to have an 
independent board negotiating committee. It provided clear guidance many have followed in the 
decades since: 
 
239 This contemporary common law approach is illustrated by Lewis v. S. L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 
764 (2d Cir. 1980) (applying New York law), holding that directors breached their duty of loyalty by 
effecting interested transactions unless they could prove they were fair to the corporation. 
240 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, §144. 
241 See Claire Hill & Brett McDonnell, Sanitizing Interested Transactions, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 903 
(2011). 
242 See Steven M. Haas, Toward a Controlling Shareholder Safe Harbor, 90 VA. L. REV. 2245 
(2004). 
243 See Matthew D. Cain & Steven M. Davidoff, Form over Substance? The Value of Corporate 
Process and Management Buy-Outs, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 849 (2011). 
244 E.g., Bennett v. Propp, 187 A. 2d 405 (Del. 1962). 
245 The following case review focuses intensively on the issue of board independence, as these 
landmark cases have been elaborately detailed in an abundant literature over many years, most recently in 
the copious treatment of Professors Cox and Thomas, supra note 8, at 380-381. A graphic summary of this 
aspect follows the discussion. Infra table accompanying note 122. 
246 457 A.2d 701 (1983). 
247 Id. at 704-05. 
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 Although perfection is not possible, or expected, the result here could have 
been entirely different if [the sub] had appointed an independent negotiating 
committee of its outside directors to deal with [the parent] at arm’s length. . . . 
Particularly in a parent-subsidiary context, a showing that the action taken was as 
though each of the contending parties had in fact exerted its bargaining power 
against the other at arm’s length is strong evidence that the transaction meets the 
test of fairness.248 
 Likewise, the other landmark of this era that permanently altered corporate law and practice 
was Smith v. Van Gorkom.249 It famously held personally liable hapless directors for failing to 
become adequately informed. The court’s factual report emphasizes the Chairman-CEO as a 
commanding figure—the dissent says it portrays the directors as victims of his “fast shuffle”250— 
and it is notable that the board was comprised of half independent and half management 
directors—five to five. 
 Turning to the two foundational cases of this period addressing changes of control, the 
emphasis again is on director independence, in Justice Moore’s classic opinions in both Unocal 
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.251 and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.252 In 
Unocal, the court decided that following the announcement of a hostile takeover bid, all director 
actions reasonably characterized as defensive were subject to enhanced duties and heightened 
scrutiny. This required directors to demonstrate “reasonable grounds for believing that a danger to 
corporate policy and effectiveness existed” and that all defensive devices were “reasonable in 
relation to the threat posed.”253   
 Having independent directors engage in an independent process goes a long way to meeting 
this burden. Justice Moore emphasized how the board meets that burden by showing good faith 
and reasonable investigation. In finding for the board, the court stressed the board’s independence 
and information: a majority were independent (8 of 14 overall and 8 of 13 at a pivotal meeting).254 
The board, especially the independent directors, were fully informed, held extensive meetings, and 
consulted closely with numerous financial and legal advisors.    
 In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,255 the board’s initial defenses to 
a hostile bid that would break up the company met Unocal’s threat/proportionality test.256 The 
court found, however, that once management’s defense also involved breaking up the company, a 
sale of the company became inevitable and the board could no longer claim to be protecting against 
that threat. The Revlon board did not meet its burden under this standard.  
 Lack of independence was a major factor. Of 14 directors, 6 were also officers and 4 were 
 
248 Id. at 710. 
249  488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). 
250  Id. at 894 (dissenting opinion). 
251 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). For my further assessment of this and related cases, see Lawrence A. 
Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law After QVC and Technicolor: A Unified 
Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 BUS. LAW. 1593 (1994). 
252 506 A. 2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
253 Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. 
254 Id. at 950. 
255 506 A. 2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
256 See Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 251. 
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associated with the companies having had “various business relationships” with the company.257  
The court therefore held that the board was not “entitled to certain presumptions that generally 
attach to the decisions of a board whose majority consists of truly outside independent 
directors.”258  Moreover, the board operated in the shadow of “personal antipathy” between their 
chairman and the bidder they disfavored;259 and gave favorable terms to one bidder that appeared 
motivated by self-interest—supporting the price of outstanding securities to reduce their risk of 
personal liability.260  
   Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc.,261 a watershed because it upheld the validity of a poison 
pill, again made director independence central. The court stressed it would be more deferential to 
decisions of boards with a majority of independent directors.262  In this case 10 of the 16-person 
board were independent.263 The court added a rhetorical note, quoting testimony by one outside 
director that it had been the most extensive discussion in his twelve years on the Household 
board.264  
 The same emphasis on independence, and deference to it, appeared in the landmark case 
of Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp.265  Conflicted directors excused themselves from 
board discussions; ensuing deliberation and vote were conducted among seven directors—four 
independent and three management. With such a majority independent, as the court put it: “proof 
that the board acted in good faith and upon reasonable investigation was materially enhanced.”266 
 In Delaware’s next landmark, Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc.,267 its 
Supreme Court held that Revlon applied when the board began an active auction of the company, 
but not when the board sought to protect and implement an extraordinary corporate transaction as 
part of its long-term strategy. In so holding, and finding for the directors, the court repeatedly 
emphasized that a majority of the directors were independent—coincidentally, 10 out of 16, just 
as in Moran;268 and that they had developed a long-term strategic plan over many years before the 
transaction in question was made.269  
 
257 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176. 
258 Id. 
259 Id. 
260 Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182-183 (“the Revlon board could not make the requisite showing of good 
faith by preferring the noteholders and ignoring its duty of loyalty to the shareholders.”). 
261 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). 
262 Id. at 1356 (proof of good faith “is materially enhanced, as we noted in Unocal, where, as here, 
a majority of the board favoring the proposal consisted of outside independent directors . . . .”). 
263 Id. at 1349 (“Household’s Board has ten outside directors and six who are members of 
management”). 
264 See also Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 (Del. 1986) (a company repurchasing its shares to 
eliminate a perceived danger must meet certain threshold standards to come within the ambit of the business 
judgment rule).  
265 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987). 
266 Id. 
267 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). 
268 Id. at 1143 (“Time’s board consisted of sixteen directors. Twelve of the directors were ‘outside,’ 
nonemployee directors. Four of the directors were also officers of the company.”). 




 In QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications, Inc.,270 another board, though 
nominally independent, failed to exercise that independence. The Paramount board approved a 
merger with Viacom, the result of which would transfer control to Viacom’s controlling 
shareholder, Sumner Redstone. The merger agreement contained significant deal protection 
clauses that Redstone publicly boasted guaranteed it would close. That, of course, would be 
inconsistent with the Paramount board’s duties. When another suitor offered an alternative deal, 
however, the Paramount board seem constrained to favor Redstone, never exercising its bargaining 
power to extract better terms. Such favoritism, like that in Revlon, manifests a lack of 
independence, warranting no judicial deference.271 
 Throughout these cases, courts avoid telling directors what to do. Even the sternest judicial 
rebukes mandate no particular steps. A famous line sums up: “there is no single blueprint that a 
board must follow to fulfill its duties.”272  The cases also stress how unified the doctrine is, with 
repeated refutations of impressions that Revlon created special duties: “Revlon is merely one of an 
unbroken line of cases that seek to prevent the conflicts of interest that arise in the field of mergers 
and acquisitions by demanding that directors act with scrupulous concern for fairness to 
shareholders.”273 And while the standards and contexts delineated in these landmarks can require 
elaborate frameworks and diagrams to organize, 274 all are united by an emphasis on whether 
directors were independent.  
 
3. Ultimate Embrace 
The emphasis on director independence has in recent years been so fully embraced that 
some observers see a substantial weakening of this line of cases, especially of Revlon.275  Consider  
Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan.,276 where the target board was almost entirely comprised of 
independent directors: all but one of ten were outside directors, that one being the CEO. That is a 
modern board that was unheard of when Revlon was decided. Despite a casual approach to the 
process and negotiations, the company’s charter exculpated the directors from mere haplessness277 
and, on the sole issue of whether they acted in good faith, the evidence indicated that they had.278 
Lyondell reflects Delaware’s veneration of director independence.   
 That veneration continued in C&J Energy Services, Inc. v. City of Miami General 
Employees’ & Sanitation Employees’ Retirement Trust.279  Again dealing with a board of mostly 
 
270 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). See Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 251. 
271 Id. 
272 Barkan v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 567 A.2d 1279 (Del. 1989).  
273 Id.; see also Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A. 2d 1075 (Del. 2001) (“Revlon neither creates a new 
type of fiduciary duty in the sale-of-control context nor alters the nature of the fiduciary duties that generally 
apply.”). 
274 See Cunningham & Yablon, supra note 251. 
275  See sources cited supra note 8. 
276 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009). 
277 Del. Code. Ann. tit. 8 § 102(b)(7) (2020).   
278 On the other hand, the bidder initially proposed $26-28 in April 2006 and was up to $48 all cash 
by July 2007. The board instructed the CEO to get the bidder’s best bid. The board was almost all 
independent, and well informed. They had multiple meetings, though minimalist, and got a break-up fee 
reduced. The board’s advisors called the bid a “blowout” and a “home run.” In the ensuing shareholder 
vote, 99% of the shares cast voted in favor of the proposal.  
279 107 A.3d 1049 (Del. 2014). 
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independent directors—five of seven280—the Delaware Supreme Court held that boards are not 
required to take any particular steps to satisfy Revlon.281 Nor does Revlon require directors to have 
“impeccable knowledge” to justify their decisions.”282 While the opinion goes on for 25 pages, 










APPENDIX B. SHAREHOLDER APPROVAL 
 
 Judicial enthusiasm for shareholder approval has a long pedigree, and has been an 
important factor in determining whether to defer to director decisions under the business judgment 
rule or scrutinize them for entire fairness. For instance, the recent Corwin case cites more than a 
dozen Delaware cases giving such credit to shareholder approval, stretching back nearly a 
century.283 Corwin does not delineate such cases in terms of the types of shareholders or prevailing 
shareholder demographics when those votes were held. But a review of the cases indicates that 
while they never mention shareholder “sophistication,” they repeatedly emphasize that 
shareholders must be informed, disinterested and uncoerced.  
 
1. Early Embrace (1930-1980) 
 Early on, courts assumed that shareholder approval, especially supermajority approval, 
sufficed to safeguard all shareholder interests. A 1928 Delaware Chancery Court decision, for 
instance, stressed that supermajority shareholder votes on both sides approving a merger meant 
that all shareholder interests were “sufficiently safeguarded.”284 On that basis, courts refused to 
enjoin a merger absent clear evidence that it was “so injurious and unfair to some minority 
complaining stockholders as to be shocking, and the court is convinced that it is so grossly unfair 
to such stockholders as to be fraudulent.”285  
 Courts of this era reasoned that such a shareholder vote ought to be accorded the same 
doctrinal deference given to directors under the business judgment rule.286 Under that reasoning, 
since director decisions win such deference only when meeting doctrinal requirements such as 
disinterest, the same was true for the shareholder vote. As for shareholder demographics, during 
this period, through the 1930s, public equity was largely held by “a small number of influential 
banks, financiers and dynasties, such as Morgan, Rockefeller and Vanderbilt.”287   
 By the 1950s, after the Great Depression and its aftermath transformed the shareholder 
base to diffuse millions of individuals and families, shareholder votes continued to earn boards 
judicial deference.288 The Delaware Supreme Court held in Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp.289 
that a voluntary stockholder approval of a stock option plan invoked the business judgment rule. 
Two years later, the Chancery Court reasoned that the same logic applied to a statutorily required 
stockholder approval of an asset sale to the company’s chairman and 30% stockholder. That meant 
a challenger would have to show such a valuation disparity as to indicate “reckless indifference” 
 
283 Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, n. 19 (Del. 2015). 
284 MacFarlane v. N. Am. Cement Corp., 157 A. 396, 398 (Del. Ch. 1928). 
285 Id. 
286 Cole v. Nat’l Cash Credit Ass’n, 156 A. 183, 188 (Del. Ch. 1931) (“The same presumption of 
fairness that supports the discretionary judgment of the managing directors must also be accorded to the 
majority of stockholders whenever they are called upon to speak for the corporation in matters assigned to 
them for decision, as is the case at one stage of the proceedings leading up to a sale of assets or a merger. 
No rational ground of distinction can be drawn in this respect between the directors on the one hand and 
the majority of stockholders on the other.”) 
287 See Cunningham & Cuba, supra note at 83. 
288 See supra text accompanying notes 79-83. 
289 91 A.2d 57, 58 (Del. 1952). 
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or “intentional disregard” for the “whole body of stockholders.”290   
 A major case concerning application of section 144 to shareholder votes made clear that 
what counts are disinterested votes.  Fliegler v. Lawrence291 involved the purchase by a mining 
company of property from several of its directors—a classic interested director transaction. 
Although also approved by a majority of shareholders, the buying directors owned a majority. The 
plain meaning of the language would let any majority vote obviate proof of fairness, but the court 
read the concept “disinterested” shareholder into it:  
We do not read the statute as providing the broad immunity for which defendants 
contend. [The statute] merely removes an ‘interested director’ could when its terms are 
met and provides against invalidation of an agreement ‘solely’ because such a director 
or officer is involved. Nothing in the statute sanctions unfairness . . . or removes the 
transaction from judicial scrutiny.292  
 The Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed these principles in the 1979 case of Michelson v. 
Duncan.293 The court insisted that to challenge an interested director transaction approved by 
disinterested shareholders, the objecting shareholder had the burden of showing, in effect, waste.294  
 In Weinberger, merger approval was conditioned on a majority of the minority vote—a 
strong plus for deal proponents as the next section explores. But the minority lacked important 
information, including the report of the common directors on their reservation price. Said Justice 
Moore: 
 [T]he minority stockholders were denied the critical information that [the 
parent] considered a price of $24 to be a good investment. Since this would have 
meant over $17,000,000 more to the minority, we cannot conclude that the 
shareholder vote was an informed one. Under the circumstances, an approval by a 
majority of the minority was meaningless.295 
Justice Moore’s urgings on director independence, and shareholder voting, seeped into practice; 
were repeatedly emphasized for decades by Delaware courts; and ultimately ordained in both 
boardrooms and courtrooms.296 A straight line runs from Weinberger to today’s cases, which 
continue to embrace the fundamental appeal of joint director and shareholder approval.  
 
2. Continued Embrace    
 One of the better-known cases to take this position is Stroud v. Grace,297 where the court 
 
290 Schiff v. RKO Pictures Corp., 104 A.2d 267, 271–72 (Del. Ch. 1954). 
291 361 A.2d 218 (Del. 1976).  
292 Id. See Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400, 405 n. 3 (Del. 1987) (in dicta, commenting that 
“approval by fully-informed disinterested stockholders ... permits invocation of the business judgment rule. 
. . .”); Benihana of Tokyo, Inc. v. Benihana, Inc., 906 A.2d 114 (Del. 2006) (holding that interested director 
of shareholder approval of an interested director transaction shifts a would-be duty of loyalty claim 
evaluated for entire fairness with the burden on interested directors, into a duty of care case evaluated under 
the business judgment rule with the burden on the challengers). 
293 407 A.2d 211, 224 (Del. 1979). 
294 Id. (that “no person of ordinary sound business judgment would say that the consideration 
received for the options was a fair exchange for the options granted.”). 
295 Id. at 712. 
296 See infra text accompanying notes 302-126 (discussing ensuing cases in this line). 
297 606 A.2d 75, 83 (Del. 1992). 
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noted that its application of enhanced scrutiny in a given case would follow only when “a board 
acted in the absence of an informed shareholder vote.” In four different opinions in 1999 alone, 
the Delaware Chancery Court followed this approach, two of which the Delaware Supreme Court 
later affirmed—in a merger,298 a spin-off,299 a charter amendment,300 and an asset sale.301 In all 
these cases, the vote would need to meet the increasingly familiar requirements of informed, 
disinterested, and uncoerced. 
 In 1994, in Kahn v. Lynch Commc’n Sys., Inc.,302 Delaware law extended the lessons from 
Weinberger, the controlling shareholder merger case. In such a case, the Lynch court held, courts 
scrutinize board actions for entire fairness, with the burden on the controller shareholder. However, 
the burden of proof shifts to the challenger if the merger was approved either by an independent 
board committee or a majority of the minority vote. 
 By the 2000s, the doctrine that a shareholder vote triggers the protections of the business 
judgment rule had been widely recognized.303 Cases from 2006, 2007, 2011 and 2014 continued 
the pattern—recognizing the invocation of the business judgment rule and stressing all the 
threshold attributes, although without inquiring into the demographic makeup of the particular 
company to probe for these features.304 
 The 2014 case of Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp.305 is a culmination of jurisprudence on 
both independent director and shareholder approval, illustrating the venerable playbook in action. 
 
298 In re Lukens Inc. S’holders Litig., 757 A.2d 720, 736–38 (Del. Ch. 1999), aff’d sub nom. Walker 
v. Lukens, Inc., 757 A.2d 1278 (Del. 2000) (fully informed stockholder approval of a merger invoked 
business judgment rule). 
299 Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d at 1127, 1133 (Del. Ch. 1999), aff’d, 746 A.2d 277 (1999) 
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A controlling shareholder proposed to acquire the rest of the stock. From the outset, it conditioned 
its proposal on two measures now long-endorsed by this long line of Delaware cases: (1) that the 
merger be negotiated and approved by a special committee of independent MFW directors and (2) 
that it be approved by a majority of minority. Both conditions were met, with nearly 2/3 of the 
requisite shares voted in favor. Objecting shareholders lost handily, as those two conditions 
compelled application of the business judgment rule.306 
 Similarly, in the 2015 case of Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC,307 the Delaware 
Supreme Court held that an uncoerced, fully informed vote of disinterested stockholders in favor 
of a challenged transaction provided an independent basis to invoke the business judgment rule. 
The court elaborated: 
 . . . the voluntary judgment of the disinterested stockholders to approve the 
merger invoked the business judgment rule standard of review and that the 
plaintiffs’ complaint should be dismissed. For sound policy reasons, Delaware 
corporate law has long been reluctant to second-guess the judgment of a 
disinterested stockholder majority that determines that a transaction with a party 
other than a controlling stockholder is in their best interests. . . . 
 . . . the doctrine applies only to fully informed, uncoerced stockholder votes, 
and if troubling facts regarding director behavior were not disclosed that would 
have been material to a voting stockholder, then the business judgment rule is not 
invoked. . . . 
 . . . When the real parties in interest—the disinterested equity owners—can 
easily protect themselves at the ballot box by simply voting no, the utility of a 
litigation-intrusive standard of review promises more costs to stockholders in the 
form of litigation rents and inhibitions on risk-taking than it promises in terms of 
benefits to them. 
While some commentators have criticized both M&F and Corwin, often expressing surprise,308 
judges have long exhorted boards to seek approval of a majority of disinterested shareholders. 
When boards heed such judicial hortatory, credit should follow, not rebuke; deference should 
follow, not review. The business judgment rule only applies, however to such shareholder votes 
that are disinterested, informed (“without full disclosure, ratification would be ineffective”) and 
uncoerced.309 The court returns to a longstanding theme in Delaware: shareholders are better than 
courts to handle such decisions.  Yet what remains open to litigation is whether particular 
shareholder votes qualify as disinterested, fully-informed and uncoerced, and there are inherent 
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